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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Modeling consumer demand is important for businesses and public policy alike and has 
thus occupied much academic attention.  The traditional neoclassical consumer theory 
assumes consumers’ utility is a function of the quantity of goods consumed.  Recent 
research has focused instead on the utility consumers derive from quality attributes of 
products, and posits that consumers make a discrete choice of one of a finite set of 
discrete bundle of attributes.  This new framework poses challenges to develop demand 
specifications based on discrete choice modeling.   
Since developed by McFadden (1973), the random utility model (RUM) has been 
the dominant theoretical framework for studying consumer behavior in discrete choice 
contexts (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000).  While the RUM assumes, as the standard 
neoclassical consumer model, that the decision maker acts rationally, it departs from the 
neoclassical theory by: (a) modeling a single choice among a finite set of mutually 
exclusive alternatives, and (b) incorporating uncertainty such as unobserved attributes of 
individuals (Bockstael and McConnell 2007).  The RUM represents the integration of 
consumer behavior and randomness, and specifyies utility in terms of deterministic and 
random influences, making it ideally suited for the econometric analysis of choice.   
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Over the past decades, a great deal of attention has been devoted to refining 
consumer preference elicitation methods.  An individual may choose her preferred 
alternative, rate how likely she would prefer the alternative on a cardinal scale, or rank 
the alternatives with or without monetary payment.   In addition, there have been 
extensive developments in discrete choice econometrics to determine the level of utility 
of each alternative.  Although the multinomial logit model has been known as a standard 
discrete choice model, researchers have made the effort to provide behavioral realism and 
to determine the empirical validity of choice models.  As results, a number of competing 
discrete choice models have emerged.  However, there remain many unanswered 
questions related to the use of preference elicitation methods and associated econometric 
models widely used to model consumer choice.   
This study seeks to answer to some of unsolved issues in preference elicitation 
methods and discrete choice econometrics, and to provide a better understanding of 
consumer demand behavior.  This dissertation consists of three essays.  The first essay 
examines the external validity of survey and experimental methods to elicit consumer 
preference.  Economists are often skeptical of stated preference methods.  Although such 
methods have gained wide-spread popularity, there are relatively few studies examining 
the validity of these methods.   This study compares the ability of the following methods 
to predict the market share of new and preexisting products in a grocery store: (a) 
hypothetical choice experiments, (b) non-hypothetical choice experiments, and (c) non-
hypothetical ranking experiments.  Moreover, for each of these elicitation methods, this 
study compares the predictive performance of the three econometric models: the 
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multinomial logit, the independent availability logit, and the random parameter logit 
models. 
The second essay departs from the traditional demand paradigm and seeks to 
determine whether consumer demand is a function of concerns for “fairness.”  The essay 
investigates whether and how consumers prefer the distribution of benefits be shared 
across the participants in the food marketing channel.  Although experimental studies 
have reported a wide array of other-regarding behavior, the pervasiveness of such 
behavior in the field is an open question.  Using data from a mail survey, people’s 
preferences, when purchasing food products, for the distribution of benefits accruing to 
participants in the food supply chain – farmers, agribusiness processors, supermarkets, 
and consumers - are estimated.  This study compares the ability of several inequality 
aversion models proposed in the general economics literature to explain food choice, and 
offers extensions to these models to better fit the food context.  Moreover, we elicit 
consumers’ perceptions about the distribution of benefits resulting from the sales of non-
organic and organic food and determine the extent to which preferences for the 
distribution of benefits can explain preferences for organic food. 
The third essay of this dissertation explores the reliability of the random 
parameter (or mixed) logit model.  Random parameter logit models are increasingly 
being reported in the literature and have become the norm in modeling choice data.  This 
transition has happened primarily as a result of the conceptual advantages of the random 
parameter logit over the multinomial logit, the fact that results from the random 
parameter logit models have straightforward interpretations as compared to some other 
models that relax independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption, and because the 
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model is supported by variety of econometric software packages.  Despite these 
conceptual advantages, most practitioners who have estimated a random parameter logit 
model are aware that the estimates can be sensitive to specification and that achieving 
convergence is not always easy, in part because the likelihood function is not necessarily 
globally concave.  Using a Monte Carlo analysis, this study determines the sensitivity of 
random parameter logit estimates.  In particular, this study examines (a) how accurate are 
RPL estimates relative to true parameter values when there is no, low, and high 
preference heterogeneity, and (b) how the accuracy of random parameter logit estimates 
varies with sample size, number of replications used in the simulated maximum 
likelihood function, and econometric software package.   
Overall, the results of this dissertation should improve understanding of consumer 
choice behavior. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF HYPOTHETICAL SURVEYS AND  
LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 
 
Introduction 
 
There is perhaps no more important question for researchers working with survey and 
experimental preference elicitation methods than whether the elicited values accurately 
predict real-world, field behavior.  A great deal of attention has been devoted in recent 
years to refining preference elicitation methods, including developments in contingent 
valuation, conjoint analysis, choice experiments, and experimental auctions.  Although a 
great deal has been learned, there are very few studies examining the external validity of 
these methods.  As such, skepticism surrounding stated and experimental willingness-to-
pay values abounds.  Practitioners advocating such methods have not adequately 
established the validity of the methods.  The primary purpose of this paper is to address 
these concerns in a specific context and determine whether results from hypothetical and 
real-money purchasing experiments accurately reflect shopping behavior in a grocery 
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store, and in the process, we also address some key issues for practitioners of revealed 
and stated preferences.   
Why might behavior in laboratory experiments differ from behavior in the field?  
Experiments often involve unfamiliar preference elicitation methods and may impose 
constraints on people that they wouldn’t normally encounter in the field.  This is to say 
that the context of the laboratory experiment often differs from the field in ways that may 
have a substantive influence on behavior.  For example, in an experimental setting people 
know their behavior is being scrutinized and social concerns may lead people to give 
“socially acceptable” answers.  As another example, experimental exercises may omit 
goods that factor prominently in consumers’ decision making processes.  Furthermore, 
there may be differences in the type of people who participate in laboratory experiments 
and those who participate in field markets.  People self-select into field markets, but are 
often recruited to participate in surveys or experiments.  A number of recent papers have 
provided detailed discussions on factors affecting the divergence in laboratory and field 
behavior, focusing on differences in the subject pool, sample selection, the nature of the 
decision task, information, the nature and extent of scrutiny, and social norms (Harrison 
and List 2004; Levitt and List 2007; List 2006).  Such discussions suggest that we should 
not always expect behavior to be identical in the lab and field, and that certain economic 
models might explain differences in the two environments.  Nevertheless, if there is no 
correspondence between lab and field behavior, we must question what it is that is really 
being measured in the laboratory and whether it has any relevance for the “real world.”  
Furthermore, many people conduct surveys or value elicitation experiments in the 
laboratory for the sole purpose of making predictions about what people will do in the 
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field.  As such, it is prudent to ask whether behavior in surveys/experiments accurately 
reflects behavior in the field, fully acknowledging that we cannot control for every 
difference between the two settings.      
  One of the key empirical findings that has bolstered criticisms of survey-based 
methods is that of hypothetical bias; the finding that willingness-to-pay elicited from 
hypothetical decision tasks almost always exceeds willingness-to-pay elicited from non-
hypothetical decision tasks (e.g., see the reviews in Little and Berrens 2004; List and 
Gallet 2001; and Murphy et al. 2005).  One interpretation of these findings is that only 
those values that can be elicited in non-hypothetical settings such as experimental 
markets are valid.  The implicit assumption is that non-hypothetical willingness-to-pay is 
the “true” value that would correspond with actual payments in the marketplace or votes 
at the poll.  However, neither hypothetical nor non-hypothetical valuation approaches are 
without their flaws and it is far from clear which approach, if either, is reflective of 
people’s real world shopping behavior.   
 In addition to the explosion of preference elicitation methods in recent years, 
there has been a parallel development in the econometrics of discrete-choice models.  
Since the work of McFadden (1973), the standard in discrete choice modeling has been 
the multinomial logit (MNL).  For years, however, people have questioned some of the 
restrictive assumptions of the MNL, which has led to a variety of competing models, 
almost all of which are generalizations of the MNL.  One such example is the random 
parameter (or mixed) logit (RPL), which relaxes the assumption of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives by modeling preference heterogeneity (McFadden and Train 2000).  
Another example is the choice-set consideration or the independent availability logit 
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(IAL), which relaxes the assumption of a deterministic choice set (Andrews and 
Srinivasan 1995; Haab and Hicks 1997; Swait and Ben-Akiva 1987).  Although the RPL 
and IAL have been found to exhibit superior in-sample fit compared to the MNL (e.g., 
Revelt and Train 1998; Swait and Ben-Akiva 1987), better in-sample fit need not imply 
better out-of-sample predictive performance.  The MNL is a more parsimonious model 
than the RPL or the IAL, and more parsimonious models are often found to exhibit better 
out-of-sample predictive performance (e.g., Kastens and Brester 1996; Murphy, Norwood, 
and Wohlgenant 2004).  This suggests the need to investigate the ability of the MNL to 
predict field behavior as compared to more flexible model specifications.   
In this paper, we compare the ability of the following methods to predict the 
market share of new and pre-existing products in a grocery store: (a) hypothetical choice 
experiments of the type frequently employed in survey work, (b) non-hypothetical choice 
experiments of the type frequently employed in laboratory experiments, and (c) a new 
non-hypothetical ranking experiment introduced by Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt (2008).1  
For each of these elicitation methods, we also compare the predictive performance of 
three econometric models: the multinomial logit (MNL), the independent availability 
logit (IAL), and the random parameter logit (RPL) models.  We find that data collected 
from the non-hypothetical ranking method and analyzed via the MNL or RPL yield the 
best forecasts of retail market shares as indicated by mean-squared error and out-of-
sample log-likelihood function values.  Overall, results suggest a high level of external 
validity for certain methods and models, a finding which should increase confidence in 
economists’ abilities to model market behavior with survey and experimental data.   
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Background 
 
A number of studies have investigated the external validity of survey and experimental 
methods.  A few studies have compared hypothetical contingent valuation survey 
responses to real, field public referenda (e.g., Johnston 2006; Vossler et al. 2003; Vossler 
and Kerkvliet 2003).  These studies have found that contingent valuation responses map 
reasonably well to observed voting behavior depending on how one chooses to model and 
code “indifferent” and “don’t know” responses with the contingent valuation method.2 
Although these studies are useful in their own right, the findings may not be particularly 
relevant to valuing private attributes related to new products, technologies, and food 
policies.  The incentives for people to give truthful and accurate answers can differ 
markedly as one moves from public to private goods and as one moves from referenda-
type questions to choice-experiment-type questions (Carson and Groves 2007). 
 Of more direct relevance to the current investigation are the few previous studies 
that have compared non-hypothetical experimental behavior to real, field shopping 
behavior (e.g., see Brookshire, Coursey, and Schulze 1987; Lusk, Pruitt, and Norwood 
2006; Shogren et al. 1999).  Brookshire, Coursey, and Schulze (1987) compared demand 
curves constructed from bids for strawberries collected in a laboratory auction to implied 
demand curves from actual purchases of strawberries made via door-to-door sales.  They 
were unable to reject the hypothesis that the valuations from the auction were no different 
than the field sales data.  Their findings thus implied that valuations were stable across 
setting (the lab versus the field) and elicitation method (auction versus purchases at a 
stated price).   
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Shogren et al. (1999) compared data from a mail survey and a non-hypothetical 
lab valuation exercise to grocery store purchases of irradiated chicken.  They found 
higher levels of acceptability of irradiated chicken in both the survey and experimental 
market as compared to the retail setting when irradiated chicken was sold at an equal or 
discounted price relative to non-irradiated chicken.  Choices in the hypothetical survey 
and non-hypothetical lab experiment were more similar to grocery store behavior when 
irradiated chicken was sold at a premium over regular chicken.  More precisely, Shogren 
et al. (1999) found that 80% of survey and experiment participants preferred irradiated to 
non-irradiated chicken breasts when the two products were offered at the same price; 
however, only about 45% of shoppers in the retail setting bought irradiated chicken when 
it was priced the same as non-irradiated.  In contrast, in all three settings (survey, 
experimental market, and store) about 33% of people bought the irradiated chicken when 
it was priced at a 10% premium over regular chicken.   
Results from Shogren et al. (1999) suggest mixed findings regarding the external 
validity of both hypothetical and non-hypothetical responses and their results seem to 
suggest that hypothetical CV responses and non-hypothetical experiments performed 
about equally well in predicting retail market share.  However, formal statistical tests 
were not carried out to determine whether one method outperformed the other.  Further, 
their finding of close similarity of real and hypothetical responses stands in stark contrast 
to the typical finding on this issue (e.g., see Fox et al. 1998 for evidence on hypothetical 
bias for irradiated food).  Additionally, and most importantly, the fact that experimental 
and survey participants received information about irradiation created a confound in the 
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comparison of survey/lab behavior and field behavior as the subjects in the survey/lab 
were informed whereas those in the grocery store were generally not.   
This study builds on previous literature in a number of ways.  First, we utilize 
what is becoming a standard valuation approach: the choice experiment.  Second, we 
carry out formal statistical tests to determine whether real or hypothetical responses to a 
choice experiment better predict actual retail sales.  Third, unlike most previous studies 
that focus on a single good, we compare predicted and actual market share for twelve 
goods in three distinct product categories including three new goods previously 
unavailable for sale in the local market.  Fourth, we explicitly refrain from providing 
experimental subjects any more information about the products than what typical 
shoppers would have in the grocery store.  Fifth, in addition to the choice-experiment 
approaches, we investigate the external validity of a new non-hypothetical conjoint 
ranking mechanism.  Finally, this study considers the out-of-sample performance of 
several competing econometric models.   
 
Methods and Procedures 
 
Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical Valuation Exercises 
As previously mentioned, one of the key factors that could cause a divergence between 
behavior in laboratory experiments and behavior in the field is differences in the people 
in the two environments.  In an attempt to ensure that the people in our experiment were 
generally reflective of shoppers in the grocery store serving as our field referent, we did 
not rely on a student sample.  A random sample of people from Stillwater, Oklahoma was 
  12
 
recruited to participate in the hypothetical and non-hypothetical valuation exercises.  The 
Bureau for Social Research at Oklahoma State University used random digit dialing 
techniques to contact people and request their participation in a “food preference study” 
in exchange for $40.  Approximately 35% of the people contacted agreed to participate in 
the study.  Recruited participants were mailed a reminder note and a map to the study’s 
location.  Upon arrival at the study site, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three 
experimental treatments: hypothetical choice, non-hypothetical choice, or non-
hypothetical ranking.3  In total, 47 consumers participated in the hypothetical choice 
treatment, 46 people participated in the non-hypothetical choice treatment, and another 
42 subjects were assigned to the non-hypothetical ranking treatment.    
The demographic characteristics of the participants, in terms of gender, education, 
income, race, and presence of children in the household were similar across the three 
treatments; we could not reject the null hypothesis of equality of these characteristics 
across the three experimental treatments.  In addition, the characteristics of participants in 
our experiment are similar to those of shoppers in the store.  To characterize the 
characteristics of store shoppers, we utilize data collected by Lusk, Norwood, and Pruitt 
(2006) from over 440 randomly intercepted shoppers in the store.  The average age in the 
store was 46.6 and the average age of our experimental participant was 46.  Half the store 
shoppers had an income less than $40,000 per year, and 59% of our experimental 
participants were in the same category.  The fraction of the sample that was white was 
87% in both the store and the experiment.  Twelve percent of store shoppers were college 
students; thirteen percent of our experimental sample was students.  Thus, our sample is 
reasonably representative of shoppers in the local grocery store, certainly more so than 
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would have been the case had our experiment used a convenience sample of students.  
This does not mean that no students participated in our experiment, only that they 
participated proportionately to their share of the local population.   
 Regardless of the treatment to which an individual was assigned, they were 
requested to investigate 12 products that were located in the front of the room.  Other 
than what could be ascertained from the packages, subjects were not given any additional 
information about the products.  The 12 products were grouped into three product 
categories: dishwashing liquid, ground beef, and wheat flour.  In each product category, 
there were three pre-existing brands and one new brand that was not available for sale in 
the local market.  The three new products were: (a) Eco-Plus, an “environmentally 
friendly” dishwashing liquid, (b) Cattle Tracks, an organic ground beef brand, and (c) GO 
Organic wheat flour, an organic and regionally grown brand.   
The products used in the experiment were chosen to mirror those offered in a 
local grocery that agreed to participate in the research.  The local store sold each of the 12 
goods, and allowed us to control the goods’ prices and obtain information on sales 
volume.  In the ground beef product category, the store sold only three types and we 
utilized all three in our experiments (fresh, lean, and diet lean) in addition to the new 
organic brand.  The same was true of the whole wheat flour category: there were three 
pre-existing brands for sale and we utilized these in our experiment to mimic what was 
available in the grocery store (the brands were: Gold Medal, Hodgson Mill, and King 
Arthur).  In the dishwashing liquid category, there were over 30 competing products on 
the store shelf.  From these, we selected the highest selling product from each of the main 
brand names (Dawn, Joy, and Palmolive). 
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 The set-up of the hypothetical and non-hypothetical choice treatments was similar 
to that in Lusk and Schroeder (2004).  In both treatments, subjects were asked to answer 
five choice questions for each product category (dishwashing liquid, ground beef, and 
wheat flour).  Thus, in total each participant answered 15 discrete choice questions (or 
shopping scenarios) regarding which product they wanted at the set of prices in the 
respective choice set.  In each choice set were five options including a “none” or “no 
purchase” option.  Prices of each of the goods were varied between $2, $3, and $4, which 
encompassed the range of prices for these products in the grocery store.  An orthogonal 
fractional factorial design was used to assign prices to products, ensuring that the prices 
each of the products were uncorrelated with each other across the design.  To achieve a 
perfectly orthogonal design, nine choice options had to be used.  We systematically 
varied these nine options across surveys so that each person only answered five choice 
questions, but the complete design was repeated several times across subjects in each 
treatment.  Figure 1 shows an example of a discrete choice question for each of the three 
product categories.  The order in which the brands were presented in the choice tasks was 
varied across participants so that our results were not unduly influenced by a possible 
order effect.  In the hypothetical choice treatments, subjects were told:  
 In each scenario, you should choose ONE of the products you would like to 
purchase or you can choose not to purchase any of the products by checking the 
last option in each shopping scenario.  For each scenario, assume that you have the 
opportunity, here and now, to purchase ONE and ONLY ONE of the items at the 
listed price.  While you will not actually buy any products today or pay the posted 
prices, please respond to each shopping scenario as if it were a real purchasing 
opportunity and you would have to give up real money were one of the 15 
scenarios to be selected as binding. 
 
In the non-hypothetical choice treatments, subjects were told: 
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After everyone completes all 15 shopping scenarios, we will ask for a volunteer to 
draw a number (1 to 15) from a hat to determine which shopping scenario will be 
binding.  In the hat are numbers 1 through 15.  If the number 1 is drawn then the 
first shopping scenario will be binding.  If the number 2 is drawn the second 
shopping scenario will be binding, and so on.  For the binding scenario, we will 
look at the product you have chosen, give you your chosen product, and you will 
pay the listed price in that scenario.  If you choose “none” you will not receive a 
product and you will pay nothing. 
 
Note:  This is a real decision making exercise.  For the randomly selected 
shopping scenario, we will really give you the chosen product and we really 
expect you to pay the price.  The price will be deducted from your $40 
participation fee.  Although only one of the 15 shopping scenarios will be binding 
there is an equal chance of any shopping scenario being selected as binding, so 
think about each answer carefully. 
 
Although non-hypothetical choice experiments are incentive compatible, they do 
not provide a great deal of information.  That is, the researcher only observes the single 
most preferred option in a choice experiment.  By contrast, a ranking-based application 
contains a consumer’s complete preference ordering.  Thus, a ranking approach might be 
more accurate than a choice-based approach because it contains more information.  
However, a ranking task differs from what people usually do at the grocery store.  Thus, 
an empirical comparison of which method (choice versus ranking) is important because 
both approaches have strengths and weaknesses and neither can be ruled out a priori as 
inferior. 
The third treatment utilized the non-hypothetical conjoint ranking approach 
introduced by Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt (2008).  In the non-hypothetical ranking 
treatment, subjects were similarly asked to respond to 15 shopping scenarios.  However, 
instead of indicating which one product they most desired in each scenario, people were 
asked to rank the products in terms of the relative desirability.  People were asked, for 
each choice set, to put a 1 next to the product which they most preferred, a 2 next to the 
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second most preferred product, and so on.  The non-hypothetical ranking valuation 
questions were similar in appearance to those shown in figure 1 with the exception that 
people were asked to rank the options instead of choosing one option.  
To ensure that the ranking task was incentive compatible, one of the 15 ranking 
scenarios was selected as binding by drawing a number from a hat.  Then, for the binding 
scenario, a second number was randomly drawn to determine which product the 
participant purchased.  In particular, after determining which of the 15 scenarios was 
binding, a second random number (1 through 36) was drawn.  If one of the numbers 1-15 
was drawn, the participant purchased the product they ranked first, if one of the numbers 
16-25 was drawn, they purchased the product they ranked second, if one of the numbers 
26-30 was drawn, they purchased the product ranked third, if the one of numbers 31-34 
was drawn, they purchased the product ranked forth, and if 35 or 36 was drawn, they 
purchased the product ranked last.  In this way, there was a higher chance a participant 
purchased a product they gave a higher rank (e.g., the chance of purchasing a product 
ranked 1st is higher than the chance of purchasing a product ranked 2nd and so on).  It is 
easy to see that a person is always better off ranking their most preferred item first, 
because the chances of it being chosen is the highest, ranking the second most preferred 
product second, and so on.  The least preferred item should be ranked last because it has 
the lowest chance of being selected.   
 
Retail Market 
We obtained agreement from a local grocery store in Stillwater, Oklahoma to participate 
in the research.  Approximately two weeks after the laboratory experiments, store 
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managers introduced the three new items (the environmentally friendly dishwashing 
liquid, organic ground beef, and organic whole wheat flour) and gave each a prominent 
shelf position.  The grocery store did not sell any other organic or environmentally 
friendly products in these product categories.  Each of the products was placed on sale for 
$4.00.   
The store kept the new products on the store shelves for one month.  During this 
period, we requested that the store hold constant the prices of the new and pre-existing 
products in each product category.  The authors visited the store each day that the 
products were sold to record the prices and ensure that each product was stocked.  After a 
month-long time period, the store provided us with sales data from the three product 
categories (fresh ground beef, dishwashing liquid, and flour) aggregated over the month 
time period.  With these data, we are able to calculate the (quantity) market share of each 
good in each product category.  Because the store failed to completely hold constant the 
prices of all pre-existing products during the time period, we used the store’s scanner data 
to calculate the weighted average price of each good over this time period.  These actual 
purchase shares can be directly compared with the predicted shares resulting from the 
laboratory experiments.   
 
Econometric Models 
Based on the random utility model, the ith consumer’s utility of choosing option j is  
(2.1)                                                 ijijij VU ε+=  
where ijV  is a deterministic component and ijε  is an iid stochastic component.  In this 
application, the deterministic portion of the utility function can be expressed as  
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(2.2)                                          ijpricejij PV αα +=  
where jα  is an alternative specific constant indicating utility for alternative j relative to 
an omitted option, priceα  represents the marginal utility of price, and ijP  is the price of 
alternative j for consumer i.  
 
Multinomial Logit Model 
Assuming that the ijε are distributed Type I Extreme Value yields the familiar MNL, 
where the probability of consumer i choosing option j out of a total of J options is:  
(2.3)                              
∑
=
=
J
k
ik
ij
V
V
j
1
)exp(
)exp(
}chosenis{Prob . 
Equation (2.3) is the appropriate model in the treatments where people made a discrete 
choice between options, however, the third treatment involved individuals ranking 
alternatives.  The ranking data can be easily analyzed in this framework using the rank-
ordered logit model, which is a straightforward extension of the MNL.  In particular, 
Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman (1981) show that out of a set of J options, the probability 
that option 1 is preferred to option 2, option 2 is preferred to option 3, option 3 is 
preferred to option 4, and so on is given by:  
(2.4)                                               ∏
∑
−
=
=
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which is simply the product of J-1 multinomial logit models. 
 
  19
 
Independent Availability Logit Model 
The MNL assumes deterministic choice sets, meaning that it is assumed that all 
consumers consider all options presented to them.  However, some people may only 
consider a subset of all available options.  If so, the MNL formula in (2.3) will be 
incorrect because the choice probabilities are calculated by summing over the utility of 
all J goods.   
To model this behavior, a probabilistic model for the choice set generation 
process can be formulated following Manski (1977).  The formulation distinguishes 
between the choice set presented in the research instrument and the consideration set, the 
latter of which contains a subset of all available options encompassing all the items 
people might actually consider.  An individual’s true consideration set cannot be known 
with certainty, but their choice behavior can be used to make probability statements about 
the likelihood of competing consideration sets being the true choice set.  Manski (1977) 
details such an estimator, with applications that can be found in Swait and Ben-Akiva 
(1987) and Ben-Akiva and Boccara (1995).  Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000) show 
that the probability of individual i choosing option j in the IAL model is 
(2.5) 
∏
∏ ∏
∑∑
∈
∈ −∈
∈
⊆ −−
−
×=×=
Cj
ij
Cj CCj
ijij
Ck
ik
ij
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ii
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i
i
)1(1
)1(
)exp(
)exp(
)(Prob)(Prob}chosenis{Prob    
where C is the set of all deterministically feasible consideration choice sets, Ci is 
consumer i’s true consideration set, and Aij is the probability that alternative j is available 
and present in the true choice set for the consumer i.  Equation (2.5) shows that the 
probability of choosing an option is determined by calculating the probability of all 
  20
 
possible consideration sets being the true choice set (in our application there are (25 – 1) 
= 31 possibilities) and for each possibility, calculating the probability that the alternative 
is chosen.  We parameterize Aij as follows  
(2.6)                                        
))exp(1(
1
j
ijA β−+
=  
where jβ  is an alternative-specific constant.  Although the IAL relaxes the assumption of 
deterministic choice sets, it assumes that the presence/absence of one alternative in the 
choice set is independent of the presence/absence of another alternative. 
 To implement the IAL with the ranking data, we followed studies such as Boyle 
et al. (2001) and “explode” the ranking data by converting the ranks into choices.  For 
example, for the product ranked first, it was assumed this product would be chosen out of 
all five alternatives.  For the product ranked second, it was assumed that it would have 
been chosen as most preferred out of the remaining four options.  For the product ranked 
third, it was assumed it would have been chosen as most preferred out of the remaining 
three options.  Finally, the product ranked fourth was assumed to have been chosen from 
the remaining pair of options.  Thus, each ranking is “exploded” into four choices, which 
are then used to estimate the IAL.4   
 
Random Parameter Logit Model 
The MNL assumes preference homogeneity in the sample, implying that all coefficients 
of the utility expression in equation (2.1) are the same across individuals.  The IAL 
allows for some heterogeneity in the extent to which people differ in terms of the 
alternatives they consider.  The random parameters logit (RPL) model allows a more 
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flexible and continuous form of preference heterogeneity, where utility coefficients vary 
across individuals according to continuous probability distribution functions.  
The RPL is implemented by specifying the alternative-specific constants shown in 
equation (2.2) as 
(2.7)                                                 ijjjij νσαα +=  
where jα  is the population mean alternative specific constant for option j, jσ  is the 
standard deviation of the distribution of the coefficient ijα  around the population mean, 
and ijν  is a stochastic term which is distributed normally with zero mean and standard 
deviation one.  As in Revelt and Train (1998), we assume the price coefficients are 
invariant across individuals.  As shown by Train (2003), the probability of choosing 
option j is 
(2.8)                       ∫ ∑
∈
= ii
Ck
ik
ij
df
V
V
j
i
αα )(
)exp(
)exp(
}chosenis{Prob  
where )( if α  is the density of the coefficients iα .  Because equation (2.8) lacks a closed 
form solution, the parameters of the model are estimated by simulated maximum 
likelihood estimation techniques following Train (2003).  As with the IAL model, to 
estimate the parameters of the RPL on the ranking data, we utilize the “exploded” 
ranking data converted into choices.   
 
Comparing Experimental Behavior to Retail Market  
The MNL, IAL, and RPL models can be used to calculate the predicted market share for 
each product based on equations (2.3), (2.5), and (2.8).  Once the parameter estimates 
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from these models are obtained, the predicted share can be estimated by substituting these 
coefficients into probability equations, given the prices utilized in the store. 
Calculating the true, field market share from the grocery store is straightforward.  
Sales data provided by the local grocery store contain the total volume and weighted-
average price of each good in each product category sold.  The total sales volume figures 
were used to calculate the quantity share each product received in each product category 
by simply dividing the sales of each good by total sales in the product category.  The 
weighted average prices of Dawn, Joy, Palmolive, and Eco-Plus in the store were $1.99, 
$1.99, $2.89, and $4, respectively.  Fresh, Lean, Diet Lean, and Organic ground beef 
were sold at prices of $1.76, $2.16, $2.58, and $4 per pound, respectively.  The prices of 
Hodgson Mill, King Arthur, Gold Medal, and GO Organic wheat flour were $2.99, $3.99, 
$2.65, and $4, respectively.  
To evaluate which elicitation method most closely predicted the real market 
shares, two criteria were used.  First, we calculated the mean squared error (MSE), which 
is simply the mean of the squared difference between the predicted and actual shares in 
each product category.  The elicitation method and econometric model with the lowest 
MSE is deemed to have the best predictive performance.  In addition to this criterion, we 
also utilized the out-of-sample log likelihood function (OSLLF) approach (Norwood, 
Lusk, and Brorsen, 2004).  The OSLLF criterion selects the models with the highest 
likelihood function values at out of sample observations.  In this study, the OSLLF can be 
calculated as: 
(2.9)                                      ∑
=
=
J
j
jj EMTMOSLLF
1
)ln(  
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where TMj is the true market share from the grocery store and EMj is the estimated 
market share for good j for a particular product category, elicitation method, and 
estimation method. 
To test the hypothesis of whether the MSE or OSLLF differs across 
elicitation/estimation method, standard errors or 95% confidence intervals must be 
calculated.  For the MNL and IAL models, 95% confidence intervals on the MSE and 
OSLLF are calculated via parametric bootstrapping following Krinsky and Robb (1986).  
Calculating such statistics for the RPL involves simulating a population of consumers for 
each parameter bootstrap.5  In addition to the 95% confidence intervals, we make use of 
the combinatorial re-sampling approach described in Poe, Giraud, and Loomis (2005) by 
utilizing the bootstrapped values from the MNL, IAL, and RPL models to test the 
hypothesis that the MSE/OSLLF is lower or higher in one method versus another. 
 
Results 
 
Table II-1 reports estimates of nine MNL models (three elicitation methods × three 
product categories).  For each elicitation method and product category, the price 
coefficient is negative, meaning higher prices are associated with a lower likelihood of 
purchase.  The alternative specific constants are estimated to indicate the utility of each 
option relative to the “none of these” option.  These parameters are generally positive, 
meaning that holding price constant, people preferred having one of the products to 
having nothing at all.  The hypothesis that all parameters are zero is rejected by a 
likelihood ratio test (p-value < 0.01) for all nine models shown in table II-1.6  
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Table II-2 presents the estimates of the IAL and RPL models.  For the IAL model, 
coefficients in the availability function are also estimated in addition to the alternative 
specific constants in utility function.  Positive parameters in the availability function 
imply a higher likelihood of a particular alternative being in the consideration choice set.  
For example, availability coefficients for Palmolive, Diet Lean, and Gold Medal are 
negative, indicating that those products are less likely to be in the true choice set.   
For the dishwashing liquid and ground beef categories, an interesting pattern of 
results emerges in the IAL.  In particular, for hypothetical choices, the alternative-
specific constants for the new products have negative signs in the utility function (i.e., α4 
< 0), but positive signs in the availability function (i.e., β4 > 0).  However, for the non-
hypothetical methods, the opposite is true (i.e., α4 > 0 and β4 < 0).  This means that in 
hypothetical situations, “none” is unlikely to be in the choice set (however, in the 
unlikely event that “none” enters the set, it is likely to be chosen).  The opposite is true 
for non-hypothetical situations: “none” is likely to be in the choice set.  One interesting 
result stemming from the non-hypothetical treatments is that the availability parameters 
on the new goods, Eco-Plus and Organic beef, are negative even though the utility 
coefficients are positive.  We interpret this result to mean that consumers who strongly 
care about organic products and/or the environment comprise a small fraction of the 
population, but their satisfaction from purchasing those products is much higher than 
from buying “conventional” products.  That is, there is a small percentage of people who 
include Eco-Plus and/or Organic beef in their choice set, and for these people these 
products are strongly preferred. 
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Table II-2 also reports results for the mean and standard deviation estimates for 
each option for the RPL model.  Results reveal large and statistically significant standard 
deviations for all products in every treatment, except for dishwashing liquid and wheat 
flour in the non-hypothetical choice method, implying a significant amount of preference 
heterogeneity.  That the magnitude of the standard deviation of preferences for King 
Arthur flour (α2) in the non-hypothetical treatment is extremely large, is indicative of the 
fact that only one subject chose this option in this particular treatment.    
Table II-3 reports the predicted market shares for each product by experimental 
treatment and econometric model.  The last column in table II-3 reports the actual market 
shares from the grocery store. Generally, we find that the predicted market shares from 
the MNL and RPL models correspond well with the actual market shares.  The exception 
to this statement is that the MNL under-predicted the success of the new organic flour in 
the grocery store.  In addition, the IAL tended to make very precise predictions, 
forecasting high market shares for a single product.  Although the IAL did a good job 
predicting which product would receive the highest market share, it tended to perform 
poorly in terms of predicting outcomes over the entire product category.  Despite this, the 
experimental data often perform remarkably well in predicting actual sales data.  For 
example, the market share estimates for all products from the MNL, non-hypothetical 
ranking treatment for dishwashing liquid never diverge from the true market share by 
more than three percentage points for any product.   
Table II-4 contains the key comparisons among the methods.  Shown in table II-4 
are the MSE and OSLLF for each experimental treatment, estimation method, and 
product category.  Focusing first on the MSE criteria, for which a lower value is preferred, 
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we find that for the dishwashing liquid category and the MNL model, the MSE for the 
non-hypothetical choice method is lowest at 0.001. However, for ground beef and whole 
wheat flour, the MSE for the non-hypothetical ranking treatment is lowest at 0.007 and 
0.105, respectively.  For the IAL model, the MSE from the non-hypothetical ranking 
method is lowest for dishwashing liquid and ground beef at 0.041 and 0.239, respectively, 
and the MSE in the non-hypothetical choice method is lowest for wheat flour at 0.221.  
For the RPL model, the MSE is lowest for the hypothetical choice method for 
dishwashing liquids, but is the highest for the ground beef and wheat flour categories.   
The second selection criterion is the OSLLF method which can be used to rank 
methods/models by likelihood function values observed at out-of-sample (grocery store) 
observations.  A higher OSLLF value is preferred.  In the MNL, the OSLLF values for 
the non-hypothetical choice method are highest, -1.006 and -1.139, respectively for 
dishwashing liquid and ground beef categories.  For the whole wheat flour categories, the 
OSLLF value for the non-hypothetical ranking method has the highest value, -1.561.  For 
the IAL model, the OSLLF values for the hypothetical choice are highest for dishwashing 
liquids.  However, overall, we can see that the IAL has poor predictive performance 
relative to the MNL and RPL.  For the RPL, OSLLF values for the real ranking method 
are highest for dishwashing liquid and whole wheat flour categories.  
Overall, the findings in table II-4 suggest that the hypothetical choice method 
performs relatively poorly at predicting market shares.  We come to this conclusion by 
restricting attention to just the MNL or RPL models, which dominate the IAL in terms of 
predictive performance.  Second, we note that within a product category, one can always 
find a lower MSE for the non-hypothetical choice as compared to the hypothetical choice 
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when selecting the lowest value across the MNL and RPL models.  For example, for 
dishwashing liquid, ground beef, and whole wheat flour, the lowest MSE values across 
the MNL and RPL models are 0.001, 0.004, and 0.191, respectively for the non-
hypothetical choice, where the comparable figures are 0.014, 0.04, and 0.251 for the 
hypothetical choice method.  Thus, so long as one has the freedom to choose the best 
econometric model, we find that making the choice task non-hypothetical significantly 
improves out-of-sample forecasts.  Carrying out the same calculation for the non-
hypothetical ranking task reveals that the lowest MSE values across the MNL and RPL 
models are 0.002, 0.005, and 0.01 for dishwashing liquid, ground beef, and whole wheat 
flour, respectively.   Thus, the non-hypothetical ranking method performs about the same 
as the non-hypothetical choice for dishwashing liquid and ground beef, but much better 
for the whole wheat flour category.      
We further summarize the findings in two ways.  First, the last three rows in table 
II-4 show the results aggregated across all three product categories.  Results reveal that 
within any particular econometric model, the MSE is the lowest and the OSLLF the 
highest for the non-hypothetical ranking method.  Test statistics derived from the 
combinatorial re-sampling method of Poe, Giraud, and Loomis (2005) indicate that, for 
each econometric model, the MSE for the non-hypothetical ranking method is 
significantly lower and the OSLLF is the significantly higher than the hypothetical choice 
method (p < 0.05).  The only exception to this statement is that there is no significant 
difference across elicitation methods if one only looks at the IAL estimates and uses the 
OSLLF criteria.  Results also reveal that, in aggregate, the RPL model out-predicts the 
MNL and the IAL regardless of elicitation method.  Results from the combinatorial re-
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sampling test indicate that the RPL yields lower MSE and higher OSLLF at the p<0.01 
level for the non-hypothetical ranking method when data are aggregated across product 
category.  For the hypothetical method, however, the differences in MSE and OSLLF 
between RPL and MNL are not statistically significant.  For the non-hypothetical 
methods, in particular, the difference in OSLLF estimated from the RPL and IAL is 
significant, indicating superiority of the RPL model in the non-hypothetical data.  Of 
course, the last three rows of table II-4 ignore differences across product category. 
 The second approach we use to summarize the results is to carry out an analysis 
of variance analysis (ANOVA) using the data in table II-4 to test the hypothesis that the 
three key variables (product category, elicitation method, and econometric model) and 
their interactions affect MSE and OSLLF.  Results shown in table II-5 reveal a very high 
R
2 indicating variation in these variables explain virtually all the variation in MSE and 
OSLLF.  Results reveal that all variables and their interactions (except the elicitation 
method × econometric method interaction) significantly influence MSE.  A similar result 
is true of OSLLF; however, the only significant interaction affecting OSLLF is the 
product category × econometric model interaction.  The F-values associated with the 
econometric model and product category are the largest, indicating that we can be most 
confident these two variables influence out-of-sample prediction performance.  Table II-5 
confirms the notion that making a decision task non-hypothetical improves out-of-sample 
prediction performance.  Results also reveal that the RPL or the MNL exhibits the best 
predictive performance depending on the product category and elicitation method.   
 
Conclusions 
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An important question in experimental economics, stated preference methods, and 
contingent valuation is whether elicited values accurately correspond with consumer 
behavior in “real” markets.  This paper considers how three elicitation methods 
(hypothetical choice, non-hypothetical choice, and non-hypothetical ranking) and three 
econometric models (the MNL, IAL, and RPL) fared in predicting actual grocery store 
sales for twelve products in three product categories (dishwashing liquid, ground beef, 
and whole wheat flour).  Our findings confirm the implicit assumption made in much of 
the work on hypothetical bias: the non-hypothetical choices are a better approximation of 
“true” preferences than are hypothetical choices.   
Recent years have witnessed a trend toward estimating discrete choice models 
that relax the assumptions of the traditional MNL.  Results suggest that relaxing these 
assumptions can not only improve in-sample fit, but can improve out-of-sample 
predictions as well.  However, this is not always true.  For example, for two out of the 
three product categories investigated, we found that the RPL exhibited the best predictive 
performance with the MNL being best in the third case.  However, the IAL, which 
relaxes the assumption of deterministic choice sets, never out-performed the MNL or 
RPL within a product category or elicitation method despite the warnings by some that 
this assumption of the MNL is overly restrictive (e.g., see Haab and Hicks, 1997; Swait 
and Ben-Akiva, 1987).  At this point, it is difficult to determine exactly why the IAL 
performed so poorly in predicting out-of-sample field behavior.  It may be that people 
form their consideration sets differently in experimental and field situations.  Indeed, the 
experimental setting, by its nature, frames a very narrow and precise consideration set.  
Imposing the structure of the estimated consideration set on field choices (where there 
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were many more options) appears to yield poor predictions.  Apparently, it is better (in 
term of out-of-sample prediction performance) to ignore modeling the choice-set 
generation process altogether than it is to model it incorrectly with overly restrictive 
experimental choice tasks.  That the RPL performed better than the MNL in two out of 
three cases is likely attributable to the fact that the RPL is a more flexible model and that 
RPL accounts for the panel or repeated nature of the choice data where the MNL did not.     
 A final note to those wary of survey and experimental methods is in order.  As 
shown in table II-3, all elicitation methods considered in this paper exhibited a reasonably 
high level of external validity.  Take for example, the predicted market share for 
dishwashing liquid from the non-hypothetical ranking task and the MNL model.  Our 
predicted market shares versus the true market shares were 0.50 vs. 0.50 for Dawn, 0.34 
vs. 0.37 for Joy, 0.13 vs. 0.14 for Palmolive, and for the new Eco-Plus product, the 
predicted value was 0.03 and the actual share was 0.00.  These findings should come as a 
welcome relief to agribusinesses in need of research to formulate pricing and marketing 
strategies and to policy makers in need of non-market values to determine the costs and 
benefits of various food labeling, food safety, and food nutrition policies.   
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Notes 
 
1. An in-depth discussion of hypothetical choice experiments is provided by Louviere, 
Hensher, and Swait (2000) and the method has been used in recent literature by 
Adamowicz et al. (1998) and Lusk, Roosen, and Fox (2003).  Alfnes et al. (2006), Ding, 
Grewal, and Liechty (2005), and Lusk and Shroeder (2004) all have implemented non-
hypothetical choice experiments.   
2. Other studies have compared hypothetical contingent valuation responses to indirect 
valuation methods such as hedonic analysis, travel cost methods, or other revealed-
preferences methods (e.g., Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams 1994; Brookshire et al. 
1982; Carson et al. 1996; Loomis, Creel, and Park 1991). 
3. Note that we did not compare responses under all four possible treatments 
(hypothetical choice, real choice, hypothetical rank, real rank); however, we still have an 
un-confounded test of the effect of real payments (within the choice experiment method) 
and an un-confounded test of the effect of moving from choices to rankings (given real 
payments).  In terms of the hypothetical bias question, we chose to focus on what is now 
a standard valuation method: the choice experiment.  In addition to this question, 
however, we were also interested in whether another method might improve on choice 
experiments.  Because Lusk, Fields, and Prevatt (2008) already showed that real and 
hypothetical rankings can differ, we chose to focus our comparison of competing 
methods on real choices and real rankings.     
4.  Although some might object to this re-coding, it is important to note that estimating 
the rank ordered logit in equation (2.4) yields the same result as estimating the MNL in 
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equation (2.3) on the “exploded” rank data.  That is, the assumption made in exploding 
the rank data is exactly the same as that made in estimating the rank-ordered logit.   
5.  To calculate the 95% confidence intervals on market share and MSE/OSLLF for the 
RPL, the following steps were taken: 1) a sample of 1,000 mean parameter vectors 
associated with jα  and σj was drawn from the original parameter vector and covariance 
matrix of the estimated model, 2) for each of the 1,000 draws, a sample of 1,000 
simulated individuals was created by drawing values of νij for each alternative (i.e., there 
are 1,000,000 generated observations), 3) for each sample of 1,000 simulated individuals, 
the mean market share and associated MSE/OSLLF was calculated, and 4) the 95% 
confidence intervals were determined by identifying the 25th and 975th highest mean 
MSE/OSLLF values across the 1,000 mean parameter draws. 
6.  Caution should be taken in directly comparing coefficients across elicitation methods 
as it involves a comparison of both the utility parameters and scale (Swait and Louviere 
1993). 
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Shopping Scenario 1: Please check the ONE item you prefer 
 
Palmolive: 
Original Scent 
(25 fl oz) 
$3.00 
↓ 
Dawn: Original 
Scent (25 fl oz) 
 
$2.00 
↓ 
Joy: Original 
Scent (25 fl oz) 
 
$4.00 
↓ 
Eco Plus 
(28 fl oz) 
 
$4.00 
↓ 
NONE 
 
 
$0.00 
↓ 
I Choose 
(check 
one) 
     
 
Shopping Scenario 6: Please check the ONE item you prefer 
 
Diet Lean 
Ground Beef 
 
$2.00 
↓ 
Fresh Ground 
Beef  
 
$4.00 
↓ 
Lean Ground  
Beef 
 
$3.00 
↓ 
Cattle Tracks 
Organic Ground 
Beef 
$4.00 
↓ 
NONE 
 
 
$0.00 
↓ 
I Choose 
(check 
one) 
     
 
Shopping Scenario 11: Please check the ONE item you prefer 
 
Gold Medal 
Whole Wheat 
Flour 
 
$3.00 
↓ 
Go Organic 
Whole Wheat 
Flour   
           
$4.00 
↓ 
King Arthur 
Whole Wheat 
Flour 
 
$2.00 
↓ 
Hodgson Mill 
Whole Wheat 
Flour 
 
$2.00 
↓ 
NONE 
 
 
$0.00 
↓ 
I Choose 
(check 
one) 
     
 
 
Figure II-1. Examples of questions for the hypothetical and non-hypothetical choices  
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Table II-1. Multinomial Logit Model Estimates by Product Category and Elicitation 
Method  
 Elicitation Method 
Commodities Hypothetical 
Choice 
Non-hypothetical 
Choice 
Non-hypothetical 
Ranking 
Dishwashing Liquid    
  1α , Dawn 4.81*
a 
(0.48)b 
1.63* 
(0.82) 
3.09* 
(0.13) 
  2α , Joy 4.06* 
(0.47) 
1.38 
(0.70) 
2.71* 
(0.12) 
  3α , Palmolive 3.76* 
(0.45) 
1.79* 
(0.78) 
2.74* 
(0.13) 
  4α , Eco-Plus 4.16* 
(0.45) 
1.66 
(0.85) 
2.53* 
(0.12) 
  priceα  -1.45* 
(0.15) 
-1.66* 
(0.33) 
-1.13* 
(0.04) 
  Log likelihood -294.29 -164.97 -884.43 
Ground Beef    
  1α , Fresh 4.02* 
(0.44) 
1.15 
(0.85) 
1.94* 
(0.23) 
  2α , Lean 5.15* 
(0.45) 
2.76* 
(0.65) 
2.43* 
(0.24) 
  3α , Diet Lean 3.99* 
(0.44) 
2.79* 
(0.75) 
2.02* 
(0.24) 
  4α , Organic 3.64* 
(0.44) 
2.47* 
(0.77) 
1.77* 
(0.23) 
  priceα  -1.28* 
(0.14) 
-1.85* 
(0.30) 
-0.82* 
(0.07) 
  Log likelihood -285.32 -184.16 -900.99 
Whole Wheat Flour    
  1α , Hodgson Mill 4.56* 
(0.50) 
2.69* 
(0.80) 
2.28* 
(0.24) 
  2α , King Arthur 3.61* 
(0.49) 
-0.41 
(1.29) 
2.46* 
(0.24) 
  3α , Gold Medal 5.78* 
(0.53) 
2.69* 
(0.78) 
2.57* 
(0.25) 
  4α , GO Organic  4.70* 
(0.51) 
1.58 
(0.90) 
2.45* 
(0.24) 
  priceα  -1.80* 
(0.16) 
-1.93* 
(0.34) 
-0.97* 
(0.07) 
  Log likelihood -261.17 -140.38 -882.66 
Number of Observations 235 230 215 
a One asterisk (*) denotes values that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
b  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table II-2. IAL and RPL Models Estimates by Product Category and Elicitation Method  
 Dishwashing Liquids  Ground Beef  Whole Wheat Flour 
 IAL RPL  IAL RPL  IAL RPL 
 Hyp Real Rank Hyp Real Rank  Hyp Real Rank Hyp Real Rank  Hyp Real Rank Hyp Real Rank 
Utility function 
1α  -12.24*
a 
(0.72)a 
1.56 
(0.93) 
2.65* 
(0.74) 
13.32* 
(2.49) 
-5.60 
(17.55) 
8.52* 
(0.00) 
 0.30 
(0.93) 
1.31 
(0.95) 
1.25 
(0.77) 
29.42* 
(10.12) 
6.31 
(8.85) 
5.82* 
(0.00) 
 -11.05* 
(1.18) 
8.22* 
(1.66) 
5.98* 
(1.23) 
17.11* 
(4.53) 
21.25 
(12.94) 
4.51* 
(.0.00) 
2α  -12.13* 
(0.74) 
2.04* 
(0.84) 
2.04* 
(0.87) 
11.04* 
(2.08) 
-25.46 
(29.02) 
5.42* 
(0.85) 
 3.60* 
(1.14) 
3.81* 
(0.82) 
3.52* 
(0.80) 
40.29* 
(13.95) 
14.31* 
(6.62) 
7.09* 
(0.00) 
 -11.86* 
(1.12) 
1.20 
(1.58) 
1.47* 
(0.67) 
12.35* 
(4.36) 
-1692 
(.5D+8) 
2.85* 
(0.00) 
3α  -12.68* 
(0.74) 
2.57* 
(0.97) 
2.89* 
(0.86) 
10.38* 
(1.96) 
13.88 
(10.37) 
4.94* 
(0.00) 
 0.84 
(1.00) 
3.80* 
(0.95) 
3.01* 
(0.76) 
27.05* 
(9.49) 
12.96* 
(5.68) 
4.90* 
(0.00) 
 -7.80* 
(1.51) 
4.84* 
(1.27) 
2.40* 
(0.66) 
21.86* 
(5.61) 
-1.26 
(7.11) 
2.95* 
(0.00) 
4α  -12.93* 
(0.67) 
5.50* 
(0.81) 
8.35* 
(2.44) 
11.80* 
(2.44) 
18.09 
(14.73) 
3.35* 
(0.00) 
 -0.13 
(0.89) 
6.37* 
(0.80) 
7.44* 
(0.76) 
1.75 
(4.76) 
20.30* 
(8.27) 
4.52* 
(0.01) 
 -11.02* 
(1.15) 
2.62* 
(1.28) 
1.26* 
(0.59) 
17.39* 
(4.48) 
8.12 
(11.22) 
7.53* 
(0.00) 
priceα  -1.64* 
(0.22) 
-1.62* 
(0.37) 
-1.52* 
(0.31) 
-4.37* 
(0.77) 
-15.84 
(11.30) 
-2.41* 
(0.26) 
 -1.85* 
(0.28) 
-1.92* 
(0.35) 
-1.43* 
(0.27) 
-10.26* 
(3.37) 
-12.12* 
(4.25) 
-2.19* 
(0.00) 
 -2.91* 
(0.54) 
-2.42* 
(0.55) 
-1.08* 
(0.22) 
-6.86* 
(1.69) 
-14.67 
(8.61) 
-2.04* 
(0.00) 
Availability/standard deviation parameters
c
 
1β /σ1 17.37* 
(0.11) 
22.87* 
(0.07) 
19.61* 
(0.08) 
5.07* 
(1.08) 
27.48 
(24.15) 
4.43* 
(0.19) 
 16.38* 
(0.09) 
22.30* 
(0.07) 
18.76* 
(0.08) 
16.39* 
(6.43) 
11.96* 
(5.78) 
4.56* 
(0.00) 
 16.42* 
(0.17) 
-2.11* 
(0.25) 
-2.53* 
(0.29) 
8.13* 
(2.64) 
13.97 
(7.84) 
4.79* 
(0.00) 
2β /σ2 17.49* 
(0.08) 
22.39* 
(0.07) 
19.58* 
(0.08) 
4.55* 
(1.16) 
41.42 
(34.05) 
3.71* 
(0.58) 
 16.85* 
(0.08) 
20.24* 
(0.07) 
18.69* 
(0.08) 
11.85* 
(4.43) 
19.60* 
(6.79) 
6.13* 
(0.00) 
 16.43* 
(0.08) 
19.30* 
(0.07) 
18.53* 
(0.07) 
8.50* 
(2.42) 
912.43 
(.2D+8) 
8.08* 
(0.00) 
3β /σ3 -17.14* 
(0.08) 
-19.65* 
(0.07) 
-18.67* 
(0.08) 
4.71* 
(1.62) 
27.64 
(21.10) 
7.16* 
(0.00) 
 -16.28* 
(0.09) 
-19.78* 
(0.07) 
-17.94* 
(0.08) 
14.92* 
(5.81) 
13.95* 
(4.97) 
6.12* 
(0.00) 
 -16.39* 
(0.10) 
-18.55* 
(0.07) 
-17.89* 
(0.07) 
7.08* 
(1.87) 
30.17 
(19.96) 
4.74* 
(0.00) 
4β /σ4 16.90* 
(0.18) 
-2.55* 
(0.31) 
-1.91* 
(0.23) 
6.21* 
(1.46) 
20.07 
(13.95) 
3.01* 
(0.00) 
 16.02* 
(0.18) 
-2.25* 
(0.27) 
-1.82* 
(0.22) 
31.90* 
(13.04) 
6.50* 
(2.41) 
4.91* 
(0.02) 
 16.58* 
(0.18) 
21.04* 
(0.07) 
18.53* 
(0.07) 
7.41* 
(2.45) 
15.89 
(11.78) 
2.96* 
(0.00) 
Noneβ  -1.61* 
(0.18) 
17.28* 
(0.22) 
17.06* 
(0.16) 
    -1.91* 
(0.23) 
17.63* 
(0.44) 
17.23* 
(0.20) 
    -1.31* 
(0.16) 
16.85* 
(0.11) 
17.07* 
(0.12) 
   
LLd -167.69 -24.11 -103.45 -223.51 -106.05 -672.07  -154.09 -49.92 -126.12 -174.39 -118.56 -647.10  -155.24 -4.73 -105.24 -201.02 -85.24 -729.44 
#  of  obs. 235 230 215 235 230 215  235 230 215 235 230 215  235 230 215 235 230 215 
a One asterisk (*) denotes values that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
b  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
c Estimates are availability parameters in the IAL standard deviations in the RPL, respectively.  
d LL is log likelihood value.  
  
3
6 
Table II-3. Market Share Estimates from Experiments and the Actual Field by Econometric Models and Elicitation Methods 
 MNL  IAL  RPL   
 Hyp 
Non 
hyp 
Rank  Hyp 
Non 
hyp 
Rank  Hyp 
Non 
hyp 
Rank  
Grocery 
Store  
Dishwashing Liquid           
 Dawn 0.63 
(0.05) a 
0.48 
(0.10) 
0.50 
(0.03) 
 0.47 
(0.07) 
0.37 
(0.11) 
0.57 
(0.08) 
 0.56 
(0.09) 
0.29 
(0.18) 
0.57 
(0.00) 
 0.50 
 Joy 0.30 
(0.04) 
0.37 
(0.09) 
0.34 
(0.02) 
 0.52 
(0.07) 
0.60 
(0.10) 
0.31 
(0.08) 
 0.32 
(0.09) 
0.18 
(0.12) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
 0.37 
 Palmolive 0.06 
(0.02) 
0.13 
(0.05) 
0.13 
(0.01) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.07 
(0.03) 
0.35 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
 0.14 
 Eco-Plus 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
 0.05 
(0.02) 
0.14 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
Ground Beef           
 Fresh 0.31 
(0.04) 
0.22 
(0.10) 
0.35 
(0.03) 
 0.07 
(0.04) 
0.15 
(0.08) 
0.14 
(0.05) 
 0.33 
(0.09) 
0.30 
(0.18) 
0.34 
(0.00) 
 0.33 
 Lean 0.58 
(0.04) 
0.52 
(0.08) 
0.41 
(0.02) 
 0.93 
(0.04) 
0.83 
(0.10) 
0.76 
(0.06) 
 0.54 
(0.08) 
0.45 
(0.11) 
0.40 
(0.00) 
 0.41 
 Diet Lean 0.11 
(0.02) 
0.25 
(0.06) 
0.19 
(0.02) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.11 
(0.02) 
0.23 
(0.08) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
 0.26 
 Organic 0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.03) 
 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
Whole Wheat Flour           
 Hodgson Mill 0.13 
(0.03) 
0.32 
(0.08) 
0.27 
(0.02) 
 0.93 
(0.06) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
 0.24 
(0.08) 
0.63 
(0.18) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
 0.21 
 King Arthur 0.01 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.15) 
0.52 
(0.08) 
 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
 0.16 
 Gold Medal 0.83 
(0.04) 
0.63 
(0.08) 
0.50 
(0.03) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.69 
(0.15) 
0.28 
(0.08) 
0.22 
(0.00) 
 0.28 
 GO Organic 0.03 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
 0.05 
(0.04) 
0.72 
(0.15) 
0.41 
(0.08) 
 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.16) 
0.31 
(0.00) 
 0.35 
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors determined via parametric bootstrapping. 
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Table II-4. Prediction Performance by Product Category, Elicitation Methods, and 
Econometric Models 
 MNL  IAL  RPL 
 MSEa OSLLFb  MSE OSLLF  MSE OSLLF 
Dishwashing Liquid   
 Hypothetical 0.028 
[0.006, 0.078]c 
-1.065 
[-1.142,-1.028] 
 
0.043 
[0.027,0.133] 
-3.336 
[-3.488,-3.238] 
 
0.014 
[0.003,0.129] 
-1.054 
[-1.253,-1.016] 
 Nonhypothetical 0.001 
[0.001,0.090] 
-1.006 
[-1.141,-1.002] 
 
0.088 
[0.026,0.277] 
-3.597 
[-3.863,-3.483] 
 
0.124 
[0.013,0.444] 
-1.298 
[-2.615,-1.035] 
 Real ranking 0.002 
[0.001,0.010] 
-1.019 
[-1.035,-1.012] 
 
0.041 
[0.026,0.116] 
-3.517 
[-3.641,-3.386] 
 
0.032 
[0.032,0.032] 
-1.052 
[-1.052,-1.052] 
Ground Beef    
 Hypothetical 0.053 
[0.027,0.098] 
-1.208 
[-1.293,-1.151] 
 
0.407 
[0.267,0.482] 
-6.108 
[-6.721,-5.580] 
 
0.040 
[0.030,0.106] 
-1.196 
[-1.321,-1.173] 
 Nonhypothetical 0.027 
[0.002,0.118] 
-1.139 
[-1.343,-1.097] 
 
0.281 
[0.113,0.384] 
-6.216 
[-6.990,-6.108] 
 
0.004 
[0.003,0.172] 
-1.126 
[-2.351,-1.098] 
 Real ranking 0.007 
[0.004,0.016] 
-1.143 
[-1.164,-1.130] 
 
0.239 
[0.133,0.335] 
-5.876 
[-6.210,-5.623] 
 
0.005 
[0.005,0.005] 
-1.140 
[-1.140,-1.139] 
Whole Wheat Flour    
 Hypothetical 0.441 
[0.343,0.524] 
-2.521 
[-2.877,-2.212] 
 
0.700 
[0.425,0.809] 
-6.257 
[-6.949,-5.709] 
 
0.251 
[0.046,0.655] 
-1.873 
[-7.422,-1.428] 
 Nonhypothetical 0.251 
[0.228,0.398] 
-2.413 
[-3.330,-2.244] 
 
0.221 
[0.163,0.375] 
-6.084 
[-6.336,-6.067] 
 
0.191 
[0.047,0.425] 
-1.871 
[-11.22,-1.676] 
 Real ranking 0.105 
[0.074,0.143] 
-1.561 
[-1.641,-1.491] 
 
0.229 
[0.185,0.369] 
-6.053 
[-6.184,-5.973] 
 
0.010 
[0.010,0.010] 
-1.364 
[-1.364,-1.364] 
Total         
 Hypothetical 0.522 -4.794  1.150 -15.701  0.305 -4.124 
 Nonhypothetical 0.279 -4.558  0.590 -15.897  0.319 -4.295 
 Real ranking 0.114 -3.722  0.509 -15.447  0.047 -3.556 
a MSE is mean squared error between predicted and actual market share summed across 
each product 
b OSLLLF is the estimated likelihood function value observed at actual market share 
values. 
c Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals determined via parametric 
bootstrapping. 
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Table II-5. F-Statistics from ANOVA Tests for Effect of Product Category, 
Elicitation Method, and Econometric Model on Prediction Performance 
  Dependent Variable 
Variable 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
MSEa OSLLFb 
Product Category 2 33.11*c 162.31* 
Elicitation Method 2 13.52* 4.79* 
Econometric Model 2 22.52* 1481.89* 
Product Category × Elicitation Method 4 7.81* 2.6 
Product Category × Econometric Model 4 6.28* 58.28* 
Elicitation Method × Econometric Model 4 2.01 0.5 
    
R2  0.96 0.99 
Number of Observations  27 27 
a Dependent variable is mean squared error between predicted and actual market shares.  
Reported values are F-statistics associated with the null hypothesis that the row variable 
does not affect mean squared error. 
b Dependent variable is the log likelihood function evaluated at out of true market share 
values.  Reported values are F-statistics associated with the null hypothesis that the row 
variable does not affect OSLLF. 
c One asterisk indicates the null hypothesis of no effect of the independent variable can be 
rejected at 0.05 level or lower. 
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III.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
FAIRNESS AND FOOD CHOICE 
                                    
Introduction 
                              
 
Although standard models of individual decision making have historically relied on the 
assumption of self-interest, experimental economists have generated a wealth of evidence 
that people are motivated by altruism, equity, and reciprocity, at least in certain 
circumstances (e.g., see Andreoni and Miller 2002; Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 
1982; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Ridel 1993).  Such findings have led to the development of 
models which seek to incorporate other-regarding behavior into the traditional economic 
framework.  Such models assume that in addition to their own payoffs, people also care 
about the payoffs others receive. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000), for examples, proposed alternative models of self-centered inequality aversion.  
Both models posit that people are motivated by their own payoff and their payoff relative 
to the payoffs of others.  By contrast, Charness and Rabin (2002) proposed a model 
where, in addition to self-interest, people exhibit preferences for efficiency and 
maximizing minimum payoffs.  Although such fairness models have recently gained 
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much attention, there have only been a few attempts to compare the relative explanatory 
power of these theories (e.g., see Bereby-Meyer and Niederle 2005; Engelmann and 
Strobel 2004; Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt 2006; Bolton and Ockenfels 2006).  To date, 
however, such comparisons have primarily been limited to abstract, experimental games 
devoid of naturally occurring field context.  Furthermore, although there are some 
counter-examples, the vast majority of such experiments have been conducted with a 
convenient sample of student subjects.  It is unclear whether and to what extent other-
regarding behavior will hold up when the decision context is moved to a more natural 
setting or when money allocations are no longer anonymous (e.g., see the findings in List, 
2006).  Finally, it is of interest to determine whether the measured preference for fairness 
exhibit predictive validity in the sense that they explain choice in a different, but related 
context.   
We consider the explanatory power of several models of other-regarding behavior 
in a field context for which all people have experience: food choice.  Recent years have 
witnessed pronounced differentiation of food products, ranging from organic to “eco-
friendly” to “hormone free” food products.  The recent growth in the organic food market 
is often attributed, in part, to people’s concerns about inequity in the food supply chain 
and motivations to support small farmers.  Indeed, one of key principles of organic 
agriculture is the concern of fairness which emphasizes the relationships to between all 
parties in the food chain – farmers, processors, distributors, traders and consumers 
(International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements).  Despite the arguments by 
some that “fairness” and support for small farms is a key benefit of organic products, we 
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are unaware of any empirical research actually linking fairness motivations with 
consumer demand for organic food.   
In this paper, we seek to determine whether fairness considerations carry over to 
food choice and determine the extent to which the fairness models proposed in the 
literature explain food purchasing behavior.  Moreover, we elicit consumers’ perceptions 
about the distribution of benefits resulting from the sales of non-organic and organic food 
and determine the extent to which preferences for the distribution of benefits can explain 
preferences for organic food.  Our results indicate that the fairness models proposed in 
the literature do not exhibit much explanatory power unless modified in nontrivial ways.  
Finally, we find that preferences for distribution of benefits, along with measured beliefs 
about the relative distribution on benefits accruing to producers of organic and 
conventional foods, are significant factors explaining consumer willingness to pay a 
premium for organic food. 
 
Methods and Procedures 
 
Survey Design 
A mail survey was developed and sent to a random sample of 2,000 consumers in the 
United States in April 2007.1  The survey contained a stated-preference experiment in 
which people were asked to respond to a series of purchase intention questions.  In 
particular, respondents were asked to indicate how likely they were to purchase 12 loaves 
of bread that differed by price and the amount of profit from the purchase going to the 
following participants in the food marketing channel: small farmers (defined as farming 
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less than 500 acres), large farmers (defined as farming 500 acres or more), agribusiness 
processors (such as wheat millers and bakers), and supermarkets.  For each loaf of bread, 
people were asked to indicate how likely they were to buy the loaf  on a scale of 0 to 10, 
where 0 was defined as “definitely would not buy,” 5 was defined as “equal chance of 
buying and not buying,” and 10 was defined as “definitely would buy.”  Across the 12 
bread options, prices were varied among the values of $1.99, $2.99, and $3.99 and the 
profits accruing to each of the participants in the food marketing channel was varied 
among the values of $0.01, $0.07, and $0.15.  Thus, the experimental design consisted of 
price being varied at three levels and the profits accruing to the four participants in the 
production of bread (small farmers, large farmers, agribusiness processors, and 
supermarkets) each being varied at three levels, creating 35 = 243 possible types of bread.  
Each survey contained 12 descriptions of bread that were randomly selected from the full 
set of 243 (i.e., no two surveys were alike: each survey had a different set of 12 bread 
options).  An example of two bread options presented to one respondent is shown in 
figure III-1.   
These stated preference questions were designed to determine people’s 
preferences for profits accruing to different participants in the food supply chain.  An 
additional goal of this study is to determine the predictive validity of such fairness 
measures and determine whether such preferences also relate to people’s willingness-to-
pay (WTP) a premium for organic vs. non-organic bread.  As such, the survey also 
elicited people’s beliefs about the distribution of benefits across the supply channel 
resulting from the sale of organic and non-organic loaves of bread.  People were asked to 
indicate how much they thought each of the following participants in the supply chain, as 
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a whole, profited from the sale of a single loaf of organic and non-organic bread: small 
farmers, large farmers, agribusiness processors, and supermarkets.  Participants 
responded by checking a box with competing dollar amounts between $0.01 to $0.05, 
$0.06 to $0.10, and $0.11 to $0.15.   
To determine the extent to which the measured preferences for distributions of 
outcomes across the food supply chain can explain people’s food preferences, the survey 
contained a question where people were asked to indicate the maximum premium they 
would be willing to pay for an organic loaf of bread over a conventional loaf of bread, 
assuming both were the same brand name.  Finally, as will be explained in more detail in 
a subsequent sub-section, to determine the extent to which fairness concerns motivate 
people’s willingness-to-pay a premium for organic bread, several additional questions 
were asked.   In particular, respondents were asked to state: (a) how much they would 
normally expect to pay for a single loaf of conventional and organic bread (i.e., expected 
market prices) and (b) the most they would be willing to pay for a conventional and 
organic loaf of bread if no other market participant (farmers, agribusinesses, or grocery 
store) made any profit and they were the only one that benefited from the purchase.   
 
Fairness Models and Econometric Methods  
To illustrate the general modeling approach, first ignore preferences for equality and 
assume that individual i’s utility from the purchase a loaf option j is: 
(3.1)                    ijGSijABijLFijSFijjij PU ,4,3,2,1 piδpiδpiδpiδβα ++++−= , 
where Pĳ is the price of the j
th loaf of bread, piSF, piLF, piAB, piGS are profits to each of the 
members of the food supply chain (small farmers, large farmers, agribusiness processors, 
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and grocery stores, respectively), αj is and alternative specific constant related to the 
utility of having and not-having a loaf of bread, and β denotes the marginal utility of 
income.  
 Because the fairness models introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000) involve a comparison of benefits to self with benefits to others, it is 
useful to re-write (3.1) to determine the net benefit a consumer receives from the 
purchase of bread option j.  In particular, we calculate the “selfish” consumer surplus of 
an option by finding the price level, P, that makes a consumer indifferent to the buying 
when δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = 0, meaning all other parties in the supply chain receive no benefit.  
Without loss of generality, assume people are indifferent to buying and not buying when 
Uij = 0.  Thus, willingness-to-pay for the loaf of bread is determined as WTP = αj/β or αj 
= βWTP.  Substituting this expression into equation (3.1) and rearranging yields: 
(3.2)              ijGSijABijLFijSFijij PWTPU ,4,3,2,1)( piδpiδpiδpiδβ ++++−= ,  
where (WTP– Pĳ) represents the consumer’s benefit or consumer surplus from the 
purchase of option j.  It is important to note that, following Train and Weeks (2005), 
WTP is a coefficient directly estimatable from the respondent’s choices, and as such, the 
consumer benefit (or consumer surplus) from purchasing an option can be determined as 
the difference between estimated willingness-to-pay and price.  Given this framework, 
we let piC,ĳ denote the ith consumer’s benefit or “profit” from bread option j, (WTP- Pĳ). 
 To determine the extent to which the fairness considerations explain food 
purchase behavior, we modify equation (3.2) as follows: 
(3.3)               ijijGSijABijLFijSFijCij FairU λpiδpiδpiδpiδβpi +++++= ,4,3,2,1, ,   
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where the variable Fairij corresponds to a particular notion of fairness or inequality 
aversion proposed in the literature and described below.   
First, we consider the model of inequality aversion advocated by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999, henceforth FS).  One portion of their inequality aversion motive can be 
captured as follows: 
(3.4)               
)]0,max()0,max(
)0,max()0,[max(
4
1
,,,,
,,,,
ijCijGSijCijAB
ijCijLFijCijSFijFSa
pipipipi
pipipipi
−+−+
−+−−=
 
If FSaij in equation (3.4) is substituted into the variable Fairij in equation (3.3), then λ 
provides a measure of people’s aversion to disadvantageous inequity.  The FS model also 
proposes that people are averse to being in an advantageous position as well.  Thus, the 
other inequality aversion motive can be captured as follows: 
(3.5)              
)]0,max()0,max(
)0,max()0,[max(
4
1
,,,,
,,,,
ijGSijCijABijC
ijLFijCijSFijCijFSb
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−+−+
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If FSbij in equation (3.5) is into substituted the variable Fairij in into equation (3.3), then 
λ provides a measure of people’s aversion to advantageous inequity.  If one includes a 
linear term for the payoff to each participant in the supply chain, as in equation (3.3), 
then the advantageous and disadvantageous motives are not separately identified, i.e., 
there is a linear identity between the linear payoff terms and the sum of the advantageous 
and disadvantageous measures in equations (3.4) and (3.5).  Thus, following Engelmann 
and Strobel (2004), we investigate the ability of the FS model to explain behavior by 
substituting the following expression into equation (3.3) 
(3.6)                                       ijijij FSbFSaFair += .     
 Secondly, we consider the model of equity, reciprocity, and competition proposed 
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by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, henceforth ERC) which assumes people dislike a 
difference between their own payoff and the average payoff.  The ERC motivation can be 
expressed as 
(3.7)                               
ij
ijC
ijij
EFF
ERCFair
,
5
1
100
pi
−×−== ,     
where EFFĳ = ijGSijABijLFIJSFijC ,,,,, pipipipipi ++++ , which represents the sum of profits to 
all five participants in the supply chain, including the consumer.  Equation (3.7) shows 
that people prefer the average profit to be as close as possible to their own profit.  The 
key contrast between the FS and ERC models is that in the ERC model, people are happy 
if they receive the average payoff regardless of whether some people earn more or less, 
but the same is not necessarily true in the FS model.  In the FS model, individual i can be 
made better off by re-distributing payoffs.   
The third model we consider is motivated by Charness and Rabin (2002), who 
posit that people are motivated, in part, by total surplus or efficiency.  Thus, to implement 
the Charness and Rabin (2002) model, we simply substitute the following expression into 
equation (3.3): 
(3.8)                                              ijij EFFFair =   
Finally, we explore an intuitive notion of inequality aversion, and investigate 
whether people are concerned about the standard deviation of profits across all supply 
chain participants,  
(3.9)                              ∑ −−==
k
ij
kjijij
EFF
SDFair 2)
5
(
5
1
pi  
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Because the standard deviation provides a depiction of profit variability, it can be 
interpreted as an alternative motivation for inequality aversion.  
   The question we now consider is how to empirically estimate the parameters of 
the model in equation (3.3).  First, we adopt the random utility framework popularized by 
McFadden, and assume that the indirect utility function given in (3.3), while known by 
the respondent, is only observable to the analyst with error.  Second, given that the 
question format requested people to respond with a rating on a cardinal scale (where the 
rating directly corresponds to the chance of making a purchase – i.e., 0=0% chance of 
making a purchase, 1=10% chance of making a purchase, etc.), we assume that an 
ordinary least squares model is appropriate, where the person’s rating is a proxy for the 
utility derived from an option, i.e., Uij = Ratingij + εij.  Third, because each respondent 
was asked to answer 12 questions regarding how likely they were to buy a loaf of bread, 
the random errors are unlikely to be independent within-subject.  Stated differently, 
unobservable heterogeneity is likely to be present across subjects.  Indeed, Erlei (2008) 
recently pointed out the importance of heterogeneity of preferences and showed that it 
plays an important role in understanding laboratory behavior.  Taken together, these 
considerations imply the following empirical model:  
(3.10)      
ijiijijGSijABijLFijSF
ijij
uFair
PWTPRating
ελpiδpiδpiδpiδ
β
+++++++
−=−
,4,3,2,1
)(5
 
where Fairĳ is one of the measures in equations (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), or (3.9),  ui ~ N(0, σu²) 
is a subject-specific random effect, and εĳ  ~ N(0, σε²) is a random error term.  Note that in 
(3.10), the constant 5 has been subtracted from the dependent variable.  This step was 
taken so that the estimated value, WTP, corresponds to the dollar amount that makes 
people indifferent to buying a loaf of bread when all other parties receive profit equal to 
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zero (by construction, a rating of 5 implies indifference toward buying, i.e., 50% chance 
of buying).  
 To test the relative performance of the four fairness models outlined above, i.e., 
equations (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), or (3.9), we consider how well the models performed in 
predicting out of sample by using cross-validation.  In particular, the sample was 
randomly split in half, and each of the four fairness models were estimated using one half 
of the data.  Then we investigated how well the estimated models predicted the “hold 
out” sample, which was the other half of the data not used in the estimation.  This process 
was then repeated by switching the estimation and hold-out samples.  To judge out-of-
sample prediction performance, two model selection criteria were used: mean squared 
error (MSE) and the out-of-sample log likelihood function (OSLLF) approach.  The MSE 
is simply the average of the squared difference between the estimated rating and the 
actual rating of the desirability of each bread option.  A model with a lower MSE is 
preferred.  The OSLLF method ranks models by likelihood function values observed at 
out of sample observations.  The OSLLF selects the model with the highest out-of-sample 
log likelihood function value and is calculated as: 
(3.11)                            ∑∑
= =
=
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1 1
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Z  is the probability density function 
for an out-of-sample observation, HijRating  is the actual rating of option j in the “hold-
out” or out-of-sample dataset, and EijingtRaˆ is the predicted rating of option j using 
parameters obtained by fitting a model to the “estimation” data set.   
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 Estimating the Fairness-Induced Willingness-to-Pay Premium for Organic Food 
In addition to investigating consumer concerns for distribution of benefits across the food 
supply chain, it is also of interest to determine the extent to which such considerations 
explain people’s preferences for organic food over conventional food.  Once the 
coefficients for a given fairness model have been estimated, they can be combined with 
people’s stated WTP, people’s perceived prices for organic and non-organic bread, and 
people’s beliefs about the profit levels for each participant in the supply chain to calculate 
the predicted utility for organic and non-organic bread:  
(3.12)         Oi
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i FairPWTPU λpiδpiδpiδpiδβ ˆˆˆˆˆ)(ˆˆ ,4,3,2,1 +++++−=  
where the O and C superscripts denote organic and conventional bread, respectively, 
WTPi
k is individual i’s stated willingness-to-pay for the kth type of bread when no other 
party in the food supply chain profits, Pi
k is i’s stated belief about what they would pay 
for the kth type of bread in the grocery store, and where pit,i
k is the i’s stated belief about 
the profits accruing to the tth business type for the kth type of bread.  With equations 
(3.12) and (3.13), the premium people are willing to pay for organic bread can be 
determined by finding the price difference between organic and conventional bread, (PO – 
P
C), that makes a person indifferent to purchasing organic or conventional non-organic 
bread:  
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 This price difference can be interpreted as the estimated premium consumers are 
predicted to be willing to pay for organic bread over conventional non-organic bread.  
This measure can be decomposed into two parts.  The first term in the right hand side of 
the equality (3.14) represents the organic premium motivated by concerns unrelated to 
the distribution of payouts accruing to parities in the food supply chain such as concerns 
about the environment, health, quality, and etc., and the second term represents the 
organic premium explained solely by concerns for payoffs accruing to other participants 
in the supply chain.  Thus, we can investigate how much the preferences for the 
distribution of benefits drive WTP for organic vs. non-organic bread.  The portion of the 
willingness-to-pay premium for organic bread explained by payoff-induced motives is: 
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 Finally, to investigate external validity, we simply calculate the correlation 
coefficient between the predicted willingness-to-pay premium for organic bread given in 
equation (3.14) and the person’s actual stated willingness-to-pay premium for organic 
bread obtained in the survey.   
 
Results 
 
Overall 210 completed surveys were returned.  After accounting for undeliverable 
addresses, a response rate of 11.5% is implied.  Although the response rate is somewhat 
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low, we emphasize that we were able to obtain data from a much more diverse subject 
pool than what would have been the case had a convenience sample of students been used.  
For example, 62% of respondents were female (which is likely a result of the fact that we 
asked the primary food shopper in the household to complete the survey), the mean age 
of the respondents was about 56 years old (with a standard deviation of 15 years), 55% of 
the sample had earned a bachelor’s degree, 17% had children under the age of 12 in the 
household, and only a small fraction of the sample (15%) said they or someone in their 
immediate family farmed or ranched for a living.  Importantly, we do not claim that our 
estimates of preferences for relative payoffs are representative of the U.S. population per 
se but rather ask, for this sample of people, whether they exhibit preferences for the 
distribution of payoffs across the food supply chain and test whether these measured 
preferences related the willingness-to-pay a premium for organic food.   
 Table III-1 reports estimates for each of four fairness models.  For each model, 
except for the FS model, the coefficient β is positive, meaning the marginal utility of 
income is positive and consumers care about their own benefit or “profit.”  All model 
specifications indicate people are willing to pay about $1.45 for a loaf of bread assuming 
no other participant in the supply chain benefits from the sale.  Coefficients for payoffs to 
small farmers, α1, are positive and statistically significant in each model, meaning people 
primarily care about the benefits to small farmers.   
 The key results relate to the estimate of the parameter λ, which correspond to the 
various fairness concerns.  The only fairness motivation that was statistically significant 
was in the ERC model, but here the coefficient was of the opposite sign than expected – 
i.e., people preferred receiving payouts the diverged from the average payout.  These 
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findings indicate that, after holding constant the payoffs to each participant in the supply 
chain, choices are either unaffected by concerns for inequity or efficiency or are affected 
in non-intuitive ways.    
 Nevertheless, because the models suggest people care about the payouts to small 
farmers, beliefs about payoff differences might explain preferences for organic bread if 
people believe small farmers benefit from selling organic bread.  The bottom portion of 
table III-1 shows the premium for organic bread over conventional bread which results 
from payouts accruing to different parties in the food supply chain.  The portion of 
premium explained by differences in relative payouts is ranges from 39.7% to 48.8%.  
One might question why these values are so large when none of the fairness parameters 
are statistically significant.  The answer is because people care about small farmers (and 
the coefficients for this particular participant are large), and because people perceive 
small farms to derive a large benefit from organic foods.  To illustrate this, table III-2 
shows people’s beliefs about the payoffs to different participants in the supply chain for 
organic and non-organic bread resulting from the sale of a single loaf of bread.  As can be 
seen in table III-2, people believe all participants in the food supply chain benefit more 
from selling organic bread, but small farmers are believed to benefit more than others.  
The bottom portion of table III-1 also shows that for the SD and EFF models, that the 
predicted willingness-to-pay premium for organic bread is positively and significantly 
correlated with people’s actual stated willingness-to-pay. 
 In general, table III-1 suggests that the fairness models proposed in the literature 
have very little explanatory power in the food choice context, at least when one controls 
for the payoff to each party.  One possible reason is that unlike simple distributional 
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games, a person’s own payoff is much less transparent when making a purchase as it is a 
result of consumer surplus – the difference between WTP and price.  This lack of 
transparency in determining one’s own benefit may cause people to be less sensitive to 
comparisons of self vs. others than is assumed in the models proposed in the literature.  
As such, we consider whether modifications to the models might improve fit.  In 
particular, we revised the fairness motivations expressed in equations (3.5), (3.6), (3.7), 
and (3.8), by excluding profits to self, piC,ĳ, and assume that people in the FS and ERC 
models are concerned about inequity as it relates to small farmers, the group that table 
III-1 indicates respondents were most concerned about.  The results of these modified 
models are reported in table III-3.   
According to the MSE and OSLLF criteria, all models in table III-3 exhibit better 
out-of-sample predictive performance than their respective counterparts in table III-1.  
Furthermore, the estimate parameters related to fairness concerns, λ, are now all 
statistically significant and of expected sign.  For SD model, the coefficient on the 
standard deviation of profits across supply chain excluding consumers’ profits is 5.655, 
meaning consumer prefer an equal distribution of profits among the agents in marketing 
channel.  That λ in the ERC is positive indicates consumers dislike small farms receiving 
payoffs that differ from the average payoff to the four other business types, and a positive 
λ in FS model indicates that participants dislike the payoffs to small farms diverging from 
payoffs to large farms, agribusinesses, and grocery stores.  Finally, the positive 
coefficient for λ in the EFF model variable implies that, all else equal, people prefer 
higher total profits to the four businesses. In each of the four models shown in table III-3, 
38.8% to 42.3% of total willingness-to-pay premium for organic foods can be explained 
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by consumers’ concerns for the distribution of profits.  Importantly, the correlation 
between the estimated premium and people’s stated willingness to pay premium is 
positive and statistically significant for all four models.  Comparing the relative 
performance of the models indicates that, overall, the modified FS model provides the 
best fit to the data.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This study investigated the extent to which several models of other-regarding can explain 
people’s food choices.  We also sought to determine whether estimated concerns for 
others’ payoffs can explain people’s willingness to pay for organic food.  Using data 
from a mail survey administered to 207 U.S. households, we found that although people 
do indeed exhibit other-regarding preferences, the existing models proposed in the 
literature do not exhibit much explanatory power.  However, when the models are 
modified to account for the fact that a person’s own surplus is less transparent in a food 
purchasing context than in simple distributional games, all models exhibit better 
explanatory power.  The modified Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model provided the best out-
of-sample prediction performance.   
 Finally, our results indicate that people’s other-regarding preferences explain a 
non-trivial portion of people’s willingness-to-pay a premium for organic food, and that 
the estimated models of other-regarding behavior exhibit reasonably high external 
validity as they are significantly related to people’s stated willingness-to-pay a premium 
for organic food.  Our findings indicate that concerns for inequity can be observed in a 
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field context, though not in the same manner as in simple laboratory distributional 
experiments. 
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Notes 
 
1. The mailing list was purchased from a reputable survey research company which 
randomly selected names from the white pages of the telephone directory.  In designing 
the survey, we followed the guidance and suggestions in Dillman (2000).  The survey 
questionnaire was mailed out with a personalized cover letter, and the mailing included a 
prepaid return envelope.  One week after the survey was send, a reminder postcard was 
mailed out.   
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Product 
Definitely 
Would Not 
Buy 
 
Equal Chance 
of Buying and 
Not Buying 
 
Definitely 
Would 
Buy 
Price of bread loaf: $2.99      
Profit to small farmers: $0.01      
Profit to large farmers: $0.15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Profit to agribusinesses: $0.01      
Profit to grocery store: $0.15      
      
Price of bread loaf: $1.99      
Profit to small farmers: $0.15      
Profit to large farmers: $0.01 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Profit to agribusinesses: $0.01      
Profit to grocery store: $0.15      
  
Figure III-1. Example Survey Questions 
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Table III-1. Model Estimates by Fairness Models with Self-Interest 
  Models  
Parameters SD ERC FS EFF 
 β 1.596 
(1.888)a 
1.280** 
(0.055) 
-2.404 
(3.343) 
2.261** 
(0.841) 
WTP 1.475** 
(0.145) 
1.422** 
(0.019) 
1.474** 
(0.145) 
1.474** 
(0.145) 
α1 14.298** 
(0.956) 
13.981** 
(0.824) 
15.301** 
(1.180) 
15.301** 
(1.180) 
α2 -0.993 
(0.936) 
-1.344 
(0.835) 
- - 
α3 -0.554 
(1.226) 
-0.465 
(0.491) 
0.538 
(0.959) 
0.538 
(0.959) 
α4 -1.499 
(0.975) 
-1.768** 
(0.817) 
-0.491 
(1.170) 
-0.491 
(1.170) 
λ
b
 -0.604 
(4.253) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
3.732 
(3.345) 
-0.933 
(0.836) 
2
uσ  2.729** 
(0.312) 
2.734** 
(0.312) 
2.729** 
(0.312) 
2.729** 
(0.312) 
Portionc 0.410 0.488 0.397 0.432 
Correlationd 0.324** 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.727) 
0.104 
(0.160) 
0.251** 
(0.001) 
MSEe 9.609 9.596 9.610 9.609 
OSLLFf -5340.913 -5339.478 -5341.041 -5341.046 
No. of Obs. 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 
No. of Respondents 207 207 207 207 
Note: * and ** represents statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
a Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.   
b SD = -standard deviation(self, small farmer, large farmer, agribusiness, grocery store), 
EFF = self + small farmer + large farmer + agribusiness + grocery store, 
ERC = -100×|(1/5)-(self/EFF)|, 
FS = FSa + FSb = -1/4[max(small farmer–self, 0) + max(large farmer–self, 0) + 
max(agribusiness–self, 0) + max(grocery store–self, 0)] -1/4[max(self-small farmer, 0) + 
max(self-large farmer, 0) + max(self-agribusiness, 0) + max(self-grocery store, 0)]. 
c Numbers are the trimmed mean of portion of estimated people’s premiums on organic 
over conventional that result solely from fairness concerns versus other factors, such as 
safety, health, or environmental concerns by discarding the five lowest and highest values.    
d Correlation between calculated people’s premium for organic versus conventional and 
stated people’s willingness-to-pay for organic.  
e MSE is mean squared error between predicted and stated rate.  
f OSLLF is the estimated likelihood function value observed at stated rate values. 
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Table III-2. Beliefs about the Distribution of Profits across the Food Supply Chain 
Resulting from the Sale of a Single Organic and Non-Organic Loaf of Bread 
Supply Chain 
Participants 
Conventional 
Non-Organic 
Organic 
Difference in 
Organic and 
Non-Organic 
Percent 
Increase from 
Non-Organic 
to Organic 
Small farmers $0.059 $0.073 $0.014 23.73% 
Large farmers $0.079 $0.089 $0.010 12.66% 
Agribusiness $0.089 $0.094 $0.005 5.62% 
Grocery store $0.100 $0.108 $0.008 8.00% 
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Table III-3. Model Estimates by Fairness Model without Self-Interest 
  Models  
Parameters SD ERC FS EFF 
 β 1.340** 
(0.058)a 
1.326**  
(0.057) 
1.333** 
(0.057) 
1.328** 
(0.058) 
WTP 1.587** 
(0.146) 
1.756** 
(0.162) 
1.644** 
(0.147) 
1.474** 
(0.145) 
α1 14.565** 
(0.819) 
14.280** 
(0.817) 
14.686** 
(0.820) 
13.815** 
(0.709) 
α2 -0.854 
(0.835) 
-1.717** 
(0.864) 
-0.896 
(0.833) 
-1.486** 
(0.713) 
α3 1.350* 
(0.736) 
-0.620 
(0.500) 
0.789 
(0.574) 
-0.948* 
(0.492) 
α4 -1.113 
(0.827) 
-2.040** 
(0.840) 
-1.136 
(0.823) 
-1.977** 
(0.706) 
λ
b
 5.655** 
(1.764) 
0.016** 
(0.005) 
5.727** 
(1.406) 
0.553* 
(0.301) 
2
uσ  2.741** 
(0.313) 
2.731** 
(0.312) 
2.738** 
(0.312) 
2.729** 
(0.312) 
Portionc 0.405 0.423 0.415 0.388 
Correlationd 0.300** 
(0.000) 
0.306** 
(0.000) 
0.286** 
(0.000) 
0.315** 
(0.000) 
MSEe 9.557 9.592 9.537 9.609 
OSLLFf -5334.278 -5338.985 -5331.771 -5341.041 
No. of Obs. 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 
No. of Respondents 207 207 207 207 
 Note: * and ** represents statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
a Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.   
b SD = -standard deviation(small farmer, large farmer, agribusiness, grocery store), 
EFF = small farmer + large farmer + agribusiness + grocery store, 
ERC = -100×|(1/4)-(small farmer/EFF)|, 
FS = FSa + FSb = -1/3[max(large farmer–small farmer, 0) + max(agribusiness–small 
farmer, 0) + max(grocery store–small farmer, 0)] -1/3[max(small farmer-large farmer, 0) 
+ max(small farmer-agribusiness, 0) + max(small farmer-grocery store, 0)]. 
c Numbers are the trimmed mean of portion of estimated people’s premiums on organic 
over conventional that result solely from fairness concerns versus other factors, such as 
safety, health, or environmental concerns by discarding the five lowest and highest values.    
d Correlation between calculated people’s premium for organic versus conventional and 
stated people’s willingness-to-pay for organic.  
e MSE is mean squared error between predicted and stated rate.  
f OSLLF is the estimated likelihood function value observed at stated rate values. 
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IV.  
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
SENSITIVITY OF MIXED LOGIT ESTIMATES TO MODEL  
SPECIFICATION, NUMBER OF REPLICATIONS,  
AND SOFTWARE PACKAGE: 
A MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
 
There have been extensive developments in discrete choice econometrics in recent years, 
and such models have been utilized in fields as diverse as accounting, finance, 
environmental and natural resource economics, marketing, and transportation (e.g., see 
Boxall, Englin, and Adamowicz 2003; Brownstone, Bunch, and Train 2000; Jones and 
Hensher 2007; Narayanan, Desiraju, and Chintagunta 2004).  Since the work of 
McFadden (1974), the standard in multinomial discrete choice modeling has been the 
multinomial (or conditional) logit (MNL) model.  The popularity of the MNL is due to its 
ease of estimation, interpretation, and calculation of probabilities.  These advantageous 
properties, however, come at a cost as they stem from the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption, which is, itself, a result of the assumption that the error 
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terms in the random utility function are independent and identically distributed across 
people and choice alternatives.   
Although the MNL has been the standard in discrete choice econometrics for over 
30 years, people have long questioned the restrictiveness of the IIA assumption and have 
developed a variety of competing models that generalize the MNL.  One such model is 
the random parameter (or mixed) logit (RPL), which relaxes the IIA assumption by 
modeling preference heterogeneity.  McFadden and Train (2000) have shown that the 
RPL can approximate any underlying random utility model.  This model first appeared in 
the economics literature a little over a decade ago, and has subsequently surged in 
popularity.  Indeed, the RPL has risen to such prominence that it has, to a large extent, 
become the norm in modeling choice data.  This transition has happened primarily as a 
result of the conceptual advantages of the RPL over the MNL (i.e., it relaxes the IIA 
assumption), the fact that results from the RPL have straightforward interpretations as 
compared to some other models that relax IIA, and because the model is supported by 
variety of econometric software packages.   
Despite these conceptual advantages, most practitioners who have estimated a 
RPL are aware that the estimates can be sensitive to specification and that achieving 
convergence is not always easy, in part because the likelihood function is not necessarily 
globally concave (e.g., see the discussion in Bajari, Fox, and Ryan 2007).  The RPL 
model lacks a closed form solution, is non-linear in parameters, and requires evaluating a 
likelihood function with multiple integrals either by simulation or by hierarchical 
Bayesian methods and Gibbs sampling.  Moreover, in a simulation environment, Chiou 
and Walker (2007) have shown the RPL model can converge with what appear to be 
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reasonable parameter estimates even when the model is unidentified either theoretically 
or empirically.  None of these factors suggest that the RPL should be abandoned, but 
such considerations suggest the need for further research on the reliability of RPL 
estimates  
In this paper, we carry out a Monte Carlo analysis to determine the sensitivity of 
RPL estimates.  First, we ask how accurate are RPL estimates relative to true parameter 
values when there is no, low, and high preference heterogeneity (i.e., no, low, and high 
violations of IIA), which should give practitioners some guidance on how reliable are the 
estimates obtained from any one particular data set.  Second, we determine how the 
accuracy of RPL estimates varies with (a) sample size, (b) number of replications used in 
the simulated maximum likelihood function, and (c) econometric software package.   
The last issue is becoming increasingly important.  The increased demand for 
estimating RPL models among researchers has resulted in the further development of 
several econometric software packages.  In practice, many researchers rely on convenient, 
“canned” routines provided in popular econometric packages to estimate the RPL.  Given 
the aforementioned concerns with the RPL, it is prudent to take a step back and determine 
the sensitivity of RPL results to a variety of factors including software package.1  
McCullough and Vinod (1999) argue that too little attention is paid to the numerical 
accuracy of econometric packages and they argue that the reliability of software packages 
cannot be taken for granted.  This is especially true in the case of the RPL where a 
myriad of choices must be made to implement the simulation and optimization algorithms, 
some explicitly acknowledged by the software package and some that are not.  That is, 
setting the same defaults on the number of simulation replications, search algorithm, and 
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convergence criteria would not guarantee equivalent RPL results across software 
packages, in part because of the lack of a closed form solution to the RPL.  Clearly 
practitioners would benefit from more information on the relative performance of 
competing software packages, and in this research we compare estimates across three of 
the most popular packages: SAS, LIMDEP-NLOGIT, and STATA.   
Our Monte Carlo results suggest a tendency for RPL estimates to exhibit bias in 
small samples – an effect that diminishes as sample size increases.  Similarly, the 
variability of RPL estimates is quite high relative to the mean in small samples.  The 
number of replications used in the simulated maximum likelihood estimation had a 
relatively small effect on precision.  Finally, our simulation results indicate differences in 
performance across software package in small samples.  Across all scenarios considered, 
the results generated by LIDMEP-NLOGIT are most accurate.     
 
The Random Parameter Logit Model 
 
Random utility theory posits that the level of utility individual i receives from choice 
alternative j is  
(4.1)                                             ijiijijU ε+= βx
' , 
where xij is a vector of observed explanatory variables describing the characteristics or 
attributes of alternative j,  βi is an individual-specific parameter vector, and εij is an iid 
stochastic component.  The RPL capture unobservable heterogeneity by modeling the 
distribution of βi in a sample of individuals, which is characterized by a continuous 
probability distribution functions.  Because the utility parameters, βi, are unobservable, 
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the likelihood of individual i choosing alternative j is equivalent to the joint probability 
that  
(4.2)                           iiJ
k iik
iij
ij dfj βΩβ
βx
βx
Ω )(
)exp(
)exp(
)(Prob
1
'
'
∫ ∑ =
= , 
where f(βi |Ω) is the density of βi and Ω is a vector of parameters characterizing the 
distribution of βi (Train 2003).  Because equation (4.2) involves a multi-dimensional 
integral, it lacks a closed form solution.  To circumvent this problem, Train (2003) 
suggests that the parameters of the model, Ω, be estimated by simulated maximum 
likelihood estimation techniques.  Using such methods, the probability in (4.2) is 
calculated by taking the average of repeated draws from )|( Ωβ if .   
The traditional method for generating such draws relies on pseudo-random 
number sequences.  Researchers have found that the speed of convergence can be 
improved by using a much smaller number of deterministic Halton draws, which evenly 
spreads values over the unit interval by taking constant factions based on a prime number 
(see Train (2003) for more detailed discussion).  Bhat (2001) and Train (1999, 2003) 
have shown that the same level of precision can be obtained with 90% fewer Halton 
draws as compared to traditional random draws.  Although the superiority of Halton 
draws is widely accepted, an open question is the number of draws needed to adequately 
simulate the probabilities in the likelihood function.  Clearly, computational time 
increases in the number of draws, and as such, researchers would prefer a smaller number 
of draws.  However, precision may also be increasing in the number of draws.  Thus, 
researchers would benefit from more information on the trade-off between computational 
time and precision.      
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Monte Carlo Experiments 
 
A Monte Carlo experiment was carried out to determine how the extent of preference 
heterogeneity, sample size, number of simulation replications, and software package 
influence RPL estimates.  In the experiments, a utility function is assumed and the 
estimated utility parameters are compared to the true values to identify how such factors 
influence the precision of the estimates.  
It was assumed that each simulated respondent made a choice among three 
alternatives (J=3), each described by two attributes, x1 and x2.  The utility derived from 
option j is  
(4.3)                         ijijiijiij xvxvU εσβσβ ++++= 22221111 )()(  
where βn and σn, n=1, 2, are the true population means and standard deviations, νnj are 
independent standard normal variables, and εij are type I extreme value random errors.  
The true parameter values assumed for βn and σn are shown in Tables IV-1, IV-2, and IV-
3, along with estimation results.  The true mean values for β1 and β2 were held constant 
across all scenarios at 2 and 5.  The true values for standard deviation, (σ1, σ2), were 
varied among the values of (0, 0), (1, 1), and (2, 5), which we refer to as no, low, and 
high preference heterogeneity.  Note that the standard deviations (0, 0) imply no 
preference heterogeneity and datasets generated under this assumption are the same as 
those assumed in the MNL.  
 Hypothetical datasets were constructed of size N=200, 500, and 1,000, so as to 
examine the impact of the sample size (i.e., number of simulated individuals) on 
precision of RPL estimates.  In each simulation scenario, N × J values were randomly 
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generated for x1ij, x2ij, and εij, and N values were generated for ν1j and ν2j.  Values for xnij 
and vnj were each drawn from independent standard normal distributions and the 
stochastic error of the utility function for each alternative, εij, was generated from a type I 
extreme value distribution as is assumed by the RPL model.  Once a data set was 
generated and the parameters estimated, the process was repeated 500 times using a new 
set of random draws.2  Thus, for each scenario, 500 estimates of the parameters β1, β2, σ1 
and σ2, were generated.  The exact code used to carry out the Monte Carlo experiments in 
each software package is provided in appendix IV-B.  In the simulation, we also 
considered the number of Halton draws used in the simulated maximum likelihood 
function.  We varied the number of draws between R=100 and R=500.   
The Monte Carlo experiment was conducted with three different econometric 
software package widely used in economic research: (a) SAS 9.1, SAS Institute Inc., (b) 
NLOGIT 4.0, Econometric Software, Inc., and (c) STATA 9.2, STATACorp LP.   Each 
of these packages contains user-friendly “canned” routines to estimate the RPL models, 
and we use these “canned” routines in our analysis.  In particular, we used the PROC 
MDC with MXL specification option in SAS, RPLOGIT in NLOGIT, and MIXLOGIT in 
STATA.  The simulated data were manipulated to feed into these routines as prescribed 
by each package.3  Each software package employs simulated maximum likelihood 
methods to estimate the RPL.  In our initial analysis, we used the default search algorithm 
and convergence criteria set by each software package under the premise that most 
practitioners would use the default, but as will be discussed momentarily, we also 
explored the effect of such defaults on parameter estimates.      
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In summary, the Monte Carlo experiment varied four treatment variables: degree 
of heterogeneity ((0, 0), (1, 1), and (2, 5)), sample size (200, 500, and 1,000), the number 
of Halton draws (100 and 500), and software package (SAS, NLOGIT, and STATA), 
producing 3 × 3 × 2 × 3 simulation scenarios.  For each simulation scenario, 500 Monte 
Carlo iterations were conducted as described above.4  Because of potential problems with 
non-convergence of outcomes, for each of the 500 models that were estimated in a 
simulation scenario, we determined whether the respective software package indicated 
convergence had been reached.  If the software package indicated a lack of convergence, 
we omitted the results from the comparisons.  NLOGIT and SAS never indicated non-
convergence across the 500 iterations for any simulation scenario, but STATA indicated 
non-convergence anywhere from one to twenty three times, and in such an instance, the 
parameters were removed from the comparison.   
                            
Results 
 
Table IV-1 shows the outcome when there is no preference heterogeneity.  Thus, one 
interpretation of the results in table IV-1 is that it illustrates the consequence of using 
RPL when in fact MNL is the true model.  Results reveal that in large samples (i.e., 
N=1,000), the RPL converges to the true values and generates estimates of standard 
deviations that are close to their true values of zero.  However, if we calculate the size of 
the test by investigating, across the 500 iterations, how often would we incorrectly 
conclude that there is significant taste heterogeneity, we find that such an outcome occurs 
5.8%, 12.8%, and 16.8% of the time when N=200, 500, and 1,000 respectively at 5% or 
lower significance level in the software package NLOGIT (see table IV-A.1 in appendix 
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A).  Thus, on the one hand, we find that there is relatively little danger in utilizing a RPL 
in large samples even if preference homogeneity exists.  On the other hand, if it is known 
that preference homogeneity is present, there is a high probability of type I error.  
Moreover, the MNL provides a much more accurate depiction of preference parameters 
than the RPL.  To illustrate this fact, the first column of results in table IV-1 shows the 
results from the conventional MNL when N=200 as estimated by SAS.  The mean MNL 
estimates, 2.094 and 5.220, are closer to the true values of 2 and 5 as compared to the 
RPL.  Furthermore, the standard deviations of MNL parameters are quite low compared 
to those from RPL with R=100 (e.g., 0.356 vs. 3.268 for β1 in SAS).      
A key result shown in table IV-1, which is re-enforced by the findings in tables 
IV-2 and IV-3 is that when sample size is small (N=200), there is a great deal of 
variability in the RPL parameter estimates across the 500 iterations, and results suggest a 
tendency for bias.  For example, results in table 2 indicate that despite the fact that the 
true value was 5, the mean estimate for β2 was 6.070, 5.649, and 5.567 in SAS, NLOGIT, 
and STATA, respectively, given N=200 and R=100.  Furthermore, the standard 
deviations of these estimates across the 500 iterations are quite high: 8.127, 2.504, and 
1.607 for SAS, NLOGIT, and STATA, respectively.  Indeed, in the case of SAS when 
N=200 and R=100, there is a more than 30% chance of obtaining a parameter value that is 
more than twice the true value!  Despite the magnitude of the standard deviations, we still 
reject the hypothesis that the mean values equal the true values when N=200 for most 
simulation scenarios considered.   
These results suggest that when the sample size is small (say, for example, with 
data from economic experiments), there may be insufficient variation to model the kind 
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of distributional information being assumed by the RPL.  That is, people may be asking 
“too much” of their data when trying to fit a RPL to data sets of small size.  Nevertheless, 
results suggest that increasing the sample size readily solves the problem.  One exception 
to this statement is in regard to the case when there is low preference heterogeneity (table 
IV-2).  The average values for the standard deviations, σ1 and σ2, do not converge to their 
true values, (1, 1) as sample size increases.  In particular, σ2 moves farther away from the 
true values as sample sizes increase in all three packages; however, the standard 
deviations of the estimates fall and the medians approach the true values.   
One somewhat surprising result is that an increase in the number of Halton draws 
from R=100 to R=500 used in simulated maximum likelihood function does meaningfully 
impact estimates.  In fact, one can easily find example in tables 1, 2, and 3 where smaller 
numbers of Halton draws produced more precise estimates.  For example, under high 
preference heterogeneity (table IV-3), when N=1,000, the differences between the mean 
estimates and true values is smaller with 100 Halton draws than with 500 draws for all 
software packages.  Of course, in repeated samples, a larger number of Halton draws 
must, by definition, give a more precise approximation to the integral.  Thus, one way of 
interpreting these findings is that the effect of moving from 100 to 500 Halton draws is 
too small to be detected given the number of Monte Carlo interactions employed in this 
study.     
 Across all three tables, there are non-trivial differences between the three software 
packages.  To summarize these differences, table IV-4 shows the root mean squared error 
(RMSE) by sample size, software package, and the number of replications in the 
simulation.  In large sample size, all three packages yield similar performance regardless 
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of the degree of heterogeneity and the number of simulations.  However, the mean RMSE 
when N=200 from SAS is 55.098 and 30.002 for R=100 and R=500, respectively, which 
is substantially higher than the values from NLOGIT and STATA.  Overall, the lowest 
RMSE is generated by NLOGIT.   
To further summarize the results, an analysis of variance analysis (ANOVA) was 
conducted to test whether RMSE is influenced by sample size, number of replications, 
and software package.  Results in table IV-5 indicate that sample size, software package, 
and their interactions significantly affect the mean of RMSEs.  The highest F-value 
corresponds to sample size; meaning we can be most confident increasing sample size 
improves accuracy.  Table IV-5 also reveals that accuracy of RPL estimates depends on 
choice of software package.  Number of Halton replications did not significantly affect 
RMSE.     
What could be the causes of the differences between econometric packages?  In 
the results in tables IV-1, IV-2, and IV-3, we utilized the default optimization algorithm 
and convergence criteria for each practitioner under the assumption that most 
practitioners would do the same.  Although all three software packages utilize simulated 
maximum likelihood to estimate the RPL model, there are some differences in defaults 
employed across software packages as indicated in table IV-6.  Thus, one possible 
explanation for the differences in performance across packages might be the different 
search algorithms used as defaults.  For example, the default optimization techniques in 
SAS, NLOGIT, and STATA are quasi-Newton, BFGS, and Newton-Raphson methods, 
respectively. To investigate this issue, we repeated the Monte Carlo simulations but 
altered the search algorithms in each package.  Overall, the results suggest that 
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differences in default search algorithm, while having some effect on precision, cannot 
fully explain differences across software packages.  Table IV-A.2 in appendix IV-A 
shows, for N=200 and R=100, results from altering the search technique.  In SAS, the 
Newton-Raphson method provided slightly better estimates than those from the default, 
quasi-Newton, but the variability in the parameter estimates remained high relative to 
NLOGIT.  Changing the search algorighim in NLOGIT had virtually no effect.  In 
STATA, the default Newton-Raphson method performed better than the BFGS method, 
primarily as a result of one extreme outlier.     
Another source of difference between packages could be the routines for 
generating random numbers for the Monte Carlo experiments.  For example, Baiocchi 
(2005) compared the four random number generators in GAUSS (rndi and rndKMi 
functions), LIMDEP, and R through the Marsaglia’s DIEHARD tests and showed that 
LIMDEP was superior to GAUSS in generating random numbers.  To rule out the 
possibility that differences in the data generating process were the cause of the 
differences across software packages, we used generated data from one package, but 
estimated the model in another.  For example, data was generated from SAS, but the RPL 
was estimated in NLOGIT.  The results when there is low heterogeneity with N=200 and 
R=100 are shown in table IV-A.3 in appendix IV-A.  Results indicate significant 
differences in software package even when the exact same data set is used, and in the 
same direction as shown in tables 1, 2, and 3, suggesting that differences in the implicit 
approaches used to generate random numbers are not responsible for the differences in 
RPL estimates across software packages.                      
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The computation times achieved by three packages are compared in table IV-7.  
For all experiments, the run times by SAS are shortest; perhaps because in SAS all the 
data was generated at once whereas in NLOGIT and STATA, a do-loop was used to 
generate the data.  The run times by NLOGIT were the longest for all experiments.  For 
example, at 500 draws with N=1000 sample sizes, NLOGIT was eight times longer than 
SAS and three times longer than STATA.  Thus, we find, as did McCullough and Vinod 
(1999) that there is a trade-off between accuracy and speed in performance by NLOGIT.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Although the RPL model is currently the most promising advance in modeling 
multinomial choices, the stability of estimates is a concerned among practitioners.  Using 
Monte Carlo experiments, this study investigated the sensitivity of RPL estimates to 
changes in sample size (N=200, 500, and 1,000), number of replications in the simulated 
likelihood function (R=100 and 500), and econometric software package (SAS, LIMDEP-
NLOGIT, and STATA) with three level of taste heterogeneity (no, low, and high).  
Results show that the MNL provides much more accurate estimates than the RPL when 
there is preference homogeneity.  Moreover, in large samples there is a high likelihood of 
type I error – finding significant taste heterogeneity when none exists.  Results indicate 
that when the sample size is small (i.e., N=200), considerable variability exists in 
estimated RPL parameters across 500 Monte Carlo iterations for all levels of preference 
heterogeneity and for each software package.  However, precision increases dramatically 
as sample size increases.  We found no relationship between the number of Halton used 
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an accuracy of RPL estimates.  Overall, NLOGIT performed relatively well for most 
scenarios, but came at the expense of increased computational time.   
  
  75
Notes 
 
1. Although not a comparison between software packages, a few papers have compared 
RPL estimates across simulated maximum likelihood and Bayesian estimation methods.  
For example, Huber and Train (2001) compared coefficients between the simulated 
maximum likelihood and Bayesian methods and found that the results of two procedures 
are similar.  In addition, Train (2001) examined the differences between the simulated 
maximum likelihood and Bayesian approaches in terms of run-time.  All the software 
packages we compare in this paper rely on simulated maximum likelihood estimation. 
2. A larger number of replications is often desirable in Monte Carlo studies; however, 
even with as few as 500 iterations, run-time was quite long with some software packages.  
In the most extreme case, it took 2.6 days to complete one of simulation scenario. 
3. The simulated data are originally arranged with one row per choice rather than one row 
per alternative.  In STATA and SAS, we had to manipulate the original data set such that 
there was one row for each alternative.  In these two packages, the data sets consisted of 
600, 1,500, and 3,000 rows when sample sizes are 200, 500, and 1000, respectively. 
NLOGIT was able to use the originally arranged data set directly.      
4. The hardware used in this study was a Pentium IV (R) CPU Processors 3.40 GHz with 
2 GB of RAM running on Microsoft Window XP Professional Version 2002 (Service 
Pack 3).  
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Table IV-1. Results of 500 Monte Carlo Experiments: Preference Homogeneity    
   SAS-MNL  SAS-RPL  NLOGIT-RPL  STATA-RPL 
Parameter True Value N=200  N=200 N=500 N=1000  N=200 N=500 N=1000  N=200 N=500 N=1000 
R=100 Halton Draws            
β1 2 2.094
a 
(0.356)b 
[2.072]c 
 2.415 
(3.268) 
[2.175] 
2.147 
(0.277) 
[2.114] 
2.091 
(0.183) 
[2.073] 
 2.253 
(0.488) 
[2.149] 
2.118 
(0.267) 
[2.076] 
2.076 
(0.183) 
[2.071] 
 2.299 
(0.952) 
[2.172] 
2.157 
(0.283) 
[2.138] 
2.093 
(0.180) 
[2.082] 
σ1 0   0.302 
(1.386) 
[0.034] 
0.202 
(0.270) 
[0.040] 
0.172 
(0.218) 
[0.037] 
 0.248 
(0.400) 
[0.025] 
0.188 
(0.258) 
[0.040] 
0.161 
(0.211) 
[0.033] 
 0.317 
(0.612) 
[0.056] 
0.210 
(0.269) 
[0.063] 
0.169 
(0.204) 
[0.064] 
β2 5 5.220 
(0.775) 
[5.144] 
 6.159 
(9.935) 
[5.439] 
5.391 
(0.680) 
[5.324] 
5.250 
(0.427) 
[5.209] 
 5.694 
(1.135) 
[5.495] 
5.325 
(0.606) 
[5.228] 
5.209 
(0.423) 
[5.187] 
 5.851 
(2.634) 
[5.455] 
5.430 
(0.712) 
[5.338] 
5.260 
(0.421) 
[5.218] 
σ2 0   0.615 
(3.702) 
[0.078] 
0.376 
(0.510) 
[0.087] 
0.305 
(0.397) 
[0.071] 
 0.484 
(0.701) 
[0.073] 
0.371 
(0.494) 
[0.088] 
0.325 
(0.391) 
[0.095] 
 0.508 
(1.177) 
[0.072] 
0.400 
(0.505) 
[0.137] 
0.325 
(0.376) 
[0.109] 
R=500 Halton Draws            
β1 2   2.257 
(0.483) 
[2.165] 
2.137 
(0.277) 
[2.103] 
2.085 
(0.183) 
[2.069] 
 2.259 
(0.615) 
[2.144] 
2.114 
(0.267) 
[2.068] 
2.074 
(0.182) 
[2.067] 
 2.255 
(0.504) 
[2.168] 
2.151 
(0.277) 
[2.131] 
2.091 
(0.180) 
[2.076] 
σ1 0   0.222 
(0.384) 
[0.007] 
0.180 
(0.274) 
[0.010] 
0.160 
(0.224) 
[0.010] 
 0.240 
(0.516) 
[0.005] 
0.171 
(0.264) 
[0.006] 
0.150 
(0.215) 
[0.008] 
 0.279 
(0.450) 
[0.012] 
0.191 
(0.272) 
[0.018] 
0.155 
(0.210) 
[0.016] 
β2 5   5.676 
(1.155) 
[5.402] 
5.358 
(0.678) 
[5.286] 
5.230 
(0.425) 
[5.185] 
 5.703 
(1.483) 
[5.436] 
5.312 
(0.604) 
[5.223] 
5.200 
(0.417) 
[5.176] 
 5.725 
(1.247) 
[5.468] 
5.414 
(0.692) 
[5.323] 
5.251 
(0.418) 
[5.213] 
σ2 0   0.369 
(0.681) 
[0.014] 
0.302 
(0.506) 
[0.015] 
0.242 
(0.391) 
[0.016] 
 0.443 
(0.822) 
[0.017] 
0.321 
(0.497) 
[0.019] 
0.284 
(0.399) 
[0.022] 
 0.418 
(0.707) 
[0.021] 
0.351 
(0.510) 
[0.031] 
0.290 
(0.388) 
[0.033] 
a Mean parameter value across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of parameters across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
c Numbers in brackets are median parameters across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
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Table IV-2. Results of 500 Monte Carlo Experiments: Low Preference Heterogeneity   
   SAS    NLOGIT    STATA  
Parameter True Value N=200 N=500 N=1000  N=200 N=500 N=1000  N=200 N=500 N=1000 
R=100 Halton Draws            
β1 2 2.386
a 
(3.034)b 
[2.073]c 
2.066 
(0.310) 
[2.021] 
2.036 
(0.224) 
[2.021] 
 2.231 
(0.990) 
[2.000] 
2.070 
(0.342) 
[2.045] 
2.019 
(0.228) 
[1.999] 
 2.197 
(0.652) 
[2.054] 
2.105 
(0.365) 
[2.065] 
2.038 
(0.239) 
[2.012] 
σ1 1 1.113 
(1.814) 
[0.939] 
1.017 
(0.371) 
[1.016] 
1.015 
(0.273) 
[1.013] 
 1.050 
(0.889) 
[0.963] 
1.014 
(0.409) 
[1.007] 
0.976 
(0.250) 
[0.981] 
 1.021 
(0.689) 
[0.972] 
1.026 
(0.411) 
[1.006] 
1.018 
(0.273) 
[1.012] 
β2 5 6.070 
(8.127) 
[5.229] 
5.165 
(0.734) 
[5.060] 
5.075 
(0.543) 
[5.018] 
 5.649 
(2.504) 
[5.109] 
5.168 
(0.823) 
[5.099] 
5.036 
(0.532) 
[4.972] 
 5.567 
(1.607) 
[5.224] 
5.227 
(0.871) 
[5.089] 
5.095 
(0.559) 
[5.029] 
σ2 1 1.149 
(3.677) 
[0.779] 
0.860 
(0.623) 
[0.894] 
0.884 
(0.507) 
[0.950] 
 0.940 
(1.220) 
[0.652] 
0.885 
(0.655) 
[0.897] 
0.884 
(0.527) 
[0.949] 
 0.931 
(0.968) 
[0.755] 
0.849 
(0.646) 
[0.842] 
0.882 
(0.497) 
[0.917] 
R=500 Halton Draws            
β1 2 2.282 
(1.884) 
[2.047] 
2.063 
(0.309) 
[2.019] 
2.037 
(0.224) 
[2.020] 
 2.226 
(1.042) 
[1.997] 
2.066 
(0.343) 
[2.042] 
2.018 
(0.228) 
[2.000] 
 2.184 
(0.629) 
[2.049] 
2.104 
(0.365) 
[2.050] 
2.043 
(0.240) 
[2.022] 
σ1 1 1.069 
(1.607) 
[0.930] 
1.013 
(0.375) 
[1.018] 
1.016 
(0.275) 
[1.015] 
 1.036 
(0.979) 
[0.951] 
1.008 
(0.413) 
[0.995] 
0.976 
(0.250) 
[0.975] 
 0.998 
(0.676) 
[0.961] 
1.024 
(0.412) 
[1.003] 
1.021 
(0.273) 
[1.017] 
β2 5 5.778 
(4.999) 
[5.182] 
5.151 
(0.742) 
[5.038] 
5.074 
(0.538) 
[5.013] 
 5.625 
(2.596) 
[5.086] 
5.148 
(0.818) 
[5.075] 
5.030 
(0.530) 
[4.983] 
 5.532 
(1.525) 
[5.199] 
5.222 
(0.868) 
[5.068] 
5.107 
(0.563) 
[5.052] 
σ2 1 0.955 
(1.966) 
[0.630] 
0.808 
(0.660) 
[0.842] 
0.856 
(0.536) 
[0.936] 
 0.882 
(1.267) 
[0.518] 
0.836 
(0.670) 
[0.858] 
0.855 
(0.548) 
[0.935] 
 0.888 
(0.963) 
[0.700] 
0.816 
(0.673) 
[0.860] 
0.877 
(0.525) 
[0.957] 
a Mean parameter value across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of parameters across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
c Numbers in brackets are median parameters across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
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Table IV-3. Results of 500 Monte Carlo Experiments: High Preference Heterogeneity   
   SAS    NLOGIT    STATA  
Parameter True Value N=200 N=500 N=1000  N=200 N=500 N=1000  N=200 N=500 N=1000 
R=100 Halton Draws            
β1 2 2.905
a 
(2.729)b 
[2.030]c 
2.220 
(0.861) 
[2.043] 
2.075 
(0.423) 
[2.015] 
 2.335 
(1.215) 
[2.037] 
2.197 
(0.821) 
[2.037] 
2.045 
(0.422) 
[1.990] 
 2.433 
(2.025) 
[1.959] 
2.280 
(1.439) 
[2.077] 
2.023 
(0.431) 
[1.979] 
σ1 2 3.109 
(3.825) 
[1.964] 
2.259 
(1.188) 
[2.044] 
2.083 
(0.601) 
[2.032] 
 2.314 
(1.697) 
[1.938] 
2.225 
(1.033) 
[2.049] 
2.025 
(0.519) 
[1.993] 
 2.414 
(2.435) 
[1.954] 
2.365 
(2.034) 
[2.086] 
2.008 
(0.578) 
[1.937] 
β2 5 7.173 
(6.035) 
[5.188] 
5.536 
(2.184) 
[5.099] 
5.199 
(0.993) 
[5.040] 
 5.923 
(3.094) 
[5.140] 
5.410 
(1.882) 
[5.031] 
5.089 
(0.982) 
[4.930] 
 6.200 
(4.784) 
[5.137] 
5.642 
(3.436) 
[5.221] 
5.109 
(0.998) 
[4.945] 
σ2 5 7.214 
(6.279) 
[5.186] 
5.562 
(2.310) 
[5.069] 
5.223 
(1.094) 
[5.076] 
 5.933 
(3.284) 
[5.093] 
5.447 
(2.025) 
[5.049] 
5.096 
(1.037) 
[4.953] 
 6.166 
(4.618) 
[5.144] 
5.706 
(3.731) 
[5.150] 
5.121 
(1.075) 
[4.990] 
R=500 Halton Draws            
β1 2 2.729 
(2.332) 
[2.060] 
2.198 
(0.718) 
[2.053] 
2.099 
(0.431) 
[2.038] 
 2.344 
(1.303) 
[2.002] 
2.182 
(0.708) 
[2.051] 
2.066 
(0.426) 
[1.998] 
 2.380 
(1.470) 
[2.001] 
2.266 
(1.270) 
[2.084] 
2.040 
(0.430) 
[1.988] 
σ1 2 2.846 
(3.210) 
[1.969] 
2.227 
(0.998) 
[2.057] 
2.111 
(0.603) 
[2.059] 
 2.318 
(1.743) 
[1.920] 
2.209 
(0.924) 
[2.032] 
2.051 
(0.524) 
[2.007] 
 2.381 
(1.947) 
[1.997] 
2.343 
(1.748) 
[2.109] 
2.027 
(0.575) 
[1.967] 
β2 5 6.724 
(4.977) 
[5.160] 
5.475 
(1.756) 
[5.061] 
5.249 
(1.015) 
[5.094] 
 5.894 
(3.042) 
[5.086] 
5.378 
(1.703) 
[5.053] 
5.139 
(1.008) 
[4.992] 
 6.018 
(3.270) 
[5.147] 
5.607 
(2.867) 
[5.227] 
5.149 
(1.008) 
[5.014] 
σ2 5 6.726 
(5.070) 
[5.243] 
5.498 
(1.881) 
[5.081] 
5.269 
(1.114) 
[5.115] 
 5.922 
(3.335) 
[5.187] 
5.411 
(1.843) 
[5.082] 
5.145 
(1.061) 
[4.974] 
 5.996 
(3.450) 
[5.114] 
5.668 
(3.181) 
[5.201] 
5.155 
(1.079) 
[5.007] 
a Mean parameter value across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of parameters across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
c Numbers in brackets are median parameters across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
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Table IV-4. Mean Root Mean Square Errors (RMSEs) by Software Package, 
Number of Replications (R), and Sample Sizes (N) 
 R=100 draws  R=500 draws 
True Value N=200 N=500 N=1000  N=200 N=500 N=1000 
SAS        
(2:0, 5:0) 18.449a 2.068 1.477  3.102 1.991 1.420 
(2:1, 5:1) 16.737 2.077 1.567  10.528 2.133 1.599 
(2:2, 5:5) 19.912 6.724 3.163  16.372 5.527 3.244 
Total 55.098 10.869 6.207  30.002 9.651 6.263 
NLOGIT        
(2:0, 5:0) 3.200 1.916 1.442  3.809 1.875 1.409 
(2:1, 5:1) 5.709 2.261 1.552  5.982 2.282 1.576 
(2:2, 5:5) 9.620 5.896 2.969  9.742 5.306 3.044 
Total 18.529 10.073 5.963  19.533 9.463 6.029 
STATA        
(2:0, 5:0) 5.731 2.139 1.459  3.356 2.072 1.433 
(2:1, 5:1) 4.041 2.353 1.592  3.912 2.383 1.628 
(2:2, 5:5) 14.222 10.814 3.093  10.508 9.260 3.114 
Total 23.994 15.306 6.144  17.776 13.715 6.175 
a Numbers are the sum of mean RMSEs of four estimated parameters relative to the true 
values.    
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Table IV-5. F-Statistics from ANOVA Tests for Effects of Number of Sample, 
Number of Replications, and Software Packages on RMSE 
Variable Degrees of Freedom F-Statistics 
Sample size  2 25.00* 
Number of replications 1 2.11 
Software package 2 3.53** 
Sample size × number of replications 2 1.56 
Sample size × software package 4 4.24* 
Number of replications × software package 2 1.05 
R
2  0.67 
Number of observations  54 
Note: One (*) and two (**) asterisks denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels of 
statistical significance, respectively. 
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Table IV-6. Default Options Employed by Three Software Packages 
 Software Package 
Option SAS NLOGIT STATA 
Estimation method Simulated ML Simulated ML Simulated ML 
Optimization algorithm Quasi-Newton BFGS Newton-Raphson 
Convergence criteria    
  Gradient 1e-5 1e-5 1e-5 
  Parameter 0 0 1e-4 
  Function 0 0 0 
Initial starting value    
  Mean ? MNL estimates MNL estimates 
  Standard Deviation ? 0 0.1 
Note:  For all software packages, Halton draws were used to simulate the likelihood 
function.  The number of draws was either 100 or 500 depending on the simulation 
scenario.  
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Table IV-7. Run-Times in Minutes of 500 Monte Carlo Simulations by Software 
Packages, Number of Replications(R), and Sample Size(N)  
 R=100 draws  R=500 draws 
True Value N=200 N=500 N=1000  N=200 N=500 N=1000 
SAS        
(2:0, 5:0) 15:42 40:11 77:39  74:29 188:19 377:16 
(2:1, 5:1) 18:21 45:52 89:40  92:34 240:31 478:46 
(2:2, 5:5) 21:02 42:15 81:53  102:41 217:16 427:46 
NLOGIT        
(2:0, 5:0) 55:44 137:50 274:46  259:13 670:43 1376:08 
(2:1, 5:1) 73:16 178:02 354:36  382:15 889:13 1801:56 
(2:2, 5:5) 141:13 337:11 2050:32  741:05 1858:20 3812:53 
STATA        
(2:0, 5:0) 44:42 108:21 214:10  156:08 388:21 787:39 
(2:1, 5:1) 64:27 137:27 275:15  231:51 507:36 1022:06 
(2:2, 5:5) 228:32 235:46 343:00  686:09 875:04 1247:20 
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APPENDIX IV-A 
Table IV-A. 1. Table Size of the Test: Percent of Cases when Significant Taste 
Heterogeneity was Incorrectly Observed (NLOGIT and R=100) 
 σ1  σ2  σ1 and σ2 
Sample 
Size 
α = 5% 
or lower 
α = 10% 
or lower 
 α = 5% or 
lower 
α = 10% 
or lower 
 α = 5% 
or lower 
α = 10% 
or lower 
N=200 2.8% 6.8%  3.0% 7.0%  0.4% 0.4% 
N=500 5.2% 9.4%  7.6% 10.6%  0.4% 0.4% 
N=1000 8.2% 11.6%  8.6% 12.6%  0.8% 1.0% 
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Table IV-A. 2. Comparison of RPL Estimates by Optimization Algorithm and 
Software Package: N=200 and R=100 case 
 True 
Value 
SAS  NLOGIT  STATA 
Parameter QN* NR  BFGS* NR  NR* BFGS 
β1 2 2.386
a 
(3.034)b 
[2.073]c 
2.312 
(1.975) 
[2.084] 
 2.231 
(0.990) 
[2.000] 
2.231 
(0.994) 
[2.000] 
 2.197 
(0.652) 
[2.054] 
2.288 
(2.020) 
[2.062] 
σ1 1 1.113 
(1.814) 
[0.939] 
1.102 
(1.606) 
[0.936] 
 1.050 
(0.889) 
[0.963] 
1.050 
(0.892) 
[0.963] 
 1.021 
(0.689) 
[0.972] 
1.158 
(2.987) 
[0.980] 
β2 5 6.070 
(8.127) 
[5.229] 
5.869 
(5.286) 
[5.202] 
 5.649 
(2.504) 
[5.109] 
5.650 
(2.510) 
[5.109] 
 5.567 
(1.607) 
[5.224] 
5.849 
(6.180) 
[5.235] 
σ2 1 1.149 
(3.677) 
[0.779] 
1.071 
(2.234) 
[0.748] 
 0.940 
(1.220) 
[0.652] 
0.940 
(1.220) 
[0.652] 
 0.931 
(0.968) 
[0.755] 
0.986 
(1.453) 
[0.743] 
Note: Algorithms QN, NR, and BFGS represent Quasi Newton, Newton-Raphson, and 
Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb, Shanno methods, respectively. 
A single asterisk (*) indicates a default algorithm for each software package. 
a Mean parameter value across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of parameters across 500 Monte Carlo 
simulations. 
c Numbers in brackets are median parameters across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
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Table IV-A. 3. Comparison of RPL Estimates by Random Numbers obtained with 
and Loaded into Software Packages: N=200 and R=100 Case 
Parameter 
True 
Value SAS - SAS SAS - NLOGIT LIMDEP - NLOGIT 
β1 2 2.386
a 
(3.034)b 
[2.073]c 
2.234 
(0.897) 
[2.079] 
2.231 
(0.990) 
[2.000] 
σ1 1 1.113 
(1.814) 
[0.939] 
1.050 
(0.863) 
[0.961] 
1.050 
(0.889) 
[0.963] 
β2 5 6.070 
(8.127) 
[5.229] 
5.669 
(2.283) 
[5.237] 
5.649 
(2.504) 
[5.109] 
σ2 1 1.149 
(3.677) 
[0.779] 
1.015 
(1.183) 
[0.825] 
0.940 
(1.220) 
[0.652] 
a Mean parameter value across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of parameters across 500 Monte Carlo 
simulations. 
c Numbers in brackets are median parameters across 500 Monte Carlo simulations. 
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Appendix IV-B: Examples of the Software Program Code 
IV-B.1. SAS  
 
dm 'log;clear;output;clear;'; 
 
* Monte Carlo Experiment for testing RPL Model 
* Sample size 200_5  
 
data raw200;  
ss=57139; 
do sample=1 to 500; 
do obs=1 to 200; 
x1=rannor(ss); x11=rannor(ss); 
x2=rannor(ss); x22=rannor(ss); 
x3=rannor(ss); x33=rannor(ss);  
b1=rannor(ss); b2=rannor(ss); 
h1=ranuni(ss); h2=ranuni(ss); h3=ranuni(ss); 
e1=-log(log(1/h1)); e2=-log(log(1/h2)); e3=-log(log(1/h3)); 
 
a1=2; a2=5; d1=2; d2=5;  
 
u1=(a1+b1*d1)*x1+(a2+b2*d2)*x11+e1; 
u2=(a1+b1*d1)*x2+(a2+b2*d2)*x22+e2; 
u3=(a1+b1*d1)*x3+(a2+b2*d2)*x33+e3; 
 
if u1>u2 and u1>u3 then c1=1; else c1=0; 
if u2>u1 and u2>u3 then c2=1; else c2=0; 
if u3>u1 and u3>u2 then c3=1; else c3=0; 
output;  
end; end;  
 
proc sort; by sample; 
proc means data=raw200; by sample; 
 
data orig; set raw200;  
keep x1 x11 x2 x22 x3 x33 c1 c2 c3 u1 u2 u3 sample; 
run; 
 
data new (keep=sample id mode x xx u c) ;  set orig; 
array var1{3} x1 x2 x3;  
array var2{3} x11 x22 x33; 
array util{3} u1 - u3; 
array ch{3} c1 - c3; 
retain id 0; 
id+1; 
do i=1 to 3; 
mode=i; 
x=var1{i}; 
xx=var2{i};  
u=util{i}; 
c=ch{i};  
output; 
end; 
run; 
 
data mc200; set new; 
proc mdc data=mc200 outest=out1 ; by sample; 
model c= x xx / nchoice = 3 type=mxl nsimul=500  
mixed=(normalparm=x xx) ; 
id id ; 
run; 
 
proc means data=out1 n mean p50 std p5 p95; 
run;  
quit; 
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IV-B.2. NLOGIT  
 
/* Monte Carlo Method: Sample Size – 200_5  */ 
reset 
timer 
calc; ran(57139) $ 
 
proc=mcset $ 
calc; ni=500; i=0 $ 
sample; 1-200 $ 
matrix; estb=init(ni,4,0) $ 
endproc 
 
proc=mcrun $ 
calc; i=0 $  
label; 9999 $ 
sample; 1-200 $ 
create; a1=2; a2=5; d1=2; d2=5 $ 
create; h1=rnu(0,1); h2=rnu(0,1); h3=rnu(0,1) $ 
create; e1=-log(log(1/h1)); e2=-log(log(1/h2)); e3=-log(log(1/h3)) $ 
create; b1=rnn(0,1); b2=rnn(0,1) $ 
create; x1=rnn(0,1); x11=rnn(0,1); x2=rnn(0,1); x22=rnn(0,1); x3=rnn(0,1); x33=rnn(0,1) $ 
create; u1=(a1+d1*b1)*x1+(a2+d2*b2)*x11+e1; 
        u2=(a1+d1*b1)*x2+(a2+d2*b2)*x22+e2; 
        u3=(a1+d1*b1)*x3+(a2+d2*b2)*x33+e3 $ 
create; if (u1>u2 & u1>u3) c1=1; (else) c1=0; 
        if (u2>u1 & u2>u3) c2=1; (else) c2=0; 
        if (u3>u1 & u3>u2) c3=1; (else) c3=0 $ 
create; if (c1=1) choice=1; if (c2=1) choice=2; if (c3=1) choice=3 $  
 
 
rplogit; lhs=choice 
       ; choices=c1, c2, c3 [1] 
       ; rhs=x1,x2,x3,x11,x22,x33 
       ; attr=x,xx 
       ; fcn=x(n),xx(n)  
       ; halton ; pds=1; maxit=100; pts=500 $ 
matrix; estb(i,*)=b $ 
 
calc; list; i=i+1 $ 
go to; 9999; i<=500 $ 
 
endproc 
 
exec; proc=mcset $ 
exec; proc=mcrun $ 
 
sample; 1-500 $ 
matrix; totest=estb $ 
matrix; xm=part(totest,1,500,1,1); xxm=part(totest,1,500,2,2); 
        xs=part(totest,1,500,3,3); xxs=part(totest,1,500,4,4) $ 
create; mcxm=xm $ 
create; mcxs=xs $ 
create; mcxxm=xxm $ 
create; mcxxs=xxs $ 
dstat; rhs=mcxm, mcxs, mcxxm, mcxxs; quantiles $ 
stop $ 
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IV-B.3. STATA  
 
* Monte Carlo Simulation: 200_5 
clear 
set seed 57139 
set more off 
set mem 100m 
set matsize 500 
local B=500 
matrix xm=J(`B',1,0) 
matrix xxm=J(`B',1,0) 
matrix xs=J(`B',1,0) 
matrix xxs=J(`B',1,0) 
timer clear 1 
 
forvalues b=1/`B' { 
timer on 1 
drop _all 
quietly set obs 200 
gen id=_n 
gen x1=invnorm(uniform()) 
gen xx1=invnorm(uniform()) 
gen x2=invnorm(uniform()) 
gen xx2=invnorm(uniform()) 
gen x3=invnorm(uniform()) 
gen xx3=invnorm(uniform()) 
gen b1=invnorm(uniform()) 
gen b2=invnorm(uniform()) 
gen h1=uniform() 
gen h2=uniform() 
gen h3=uniform() 
gen a1=2 
gen a2=5 
gen d1=2 
gen d2=5 
gen e1=-log(log(1/h1)) 
gen e2=-log(log(1/h2)) 
gen e3=-log(log(1/h3)) 
gen u1=(a1+d1*b1)*x1+(a2+d2*b2)*xx1+e1 
gen u2=(a1+d1*b1)*x2+(a2+d2*b2)*xx2+e2 
gen u3=(a1+d1*b1)*x3+(a2+d2*b2)*xx3+e3 
 
gen choice=. 
replace choice=1 if u1>u2 & u1>u3 
replace choice=2 if u2>u1 & u2>u3 
replace choice=3 if u3>u1 & u3>u2 
   
case2alt, alt(x xx) case(id) choice(choice) gen(choice2) altnum(mode) 
 
mixlogit choice2, group(id) rand(x xx) nrep(500) iterate(100) 
matrix beta=e(b) 
 
matrix xm[`b',1]=beta[1,1] 
matrix xxm[`b',1]=beta[1,2] 
matrix xs[`b',1]=beta[1,3] 
matrix xxs[`b',1]=beta[1,4] 
 
timer off 1 
} 
timer list 1 
drop _all 
svmat xm 
svmat xxm 
svmat xs 
svmat xxs 
 
summ *, det  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Stated preference data obtained through real and hypothetical surveys and experiments 
are frequently used to determine consumers demand for product attributes.  Although 
such data are increasingly being used in economic research, there remain doubts about 
the validity of preference elicitation methods and econometric models used to estimate 
consumer preferences.  This study explores such doubts and provides richer 
understanding of consumer demand.  
The first essay addressed an important question in experimental economics, stated 
preference methods, and conjoint analysis: whether elicited values are consisted with 
observed values in the field.  This study investigated the ability of three preference 
elicitation methods (hypothetical choices, non-hypothetical choices, and non-hypothetical 
rankings) and three discrete choice econometric models (the MNL, the IAL, and RPL) to 
predict actual retail shopping behavior for twelve products in three different product 
categories (ground beef, wheat flour, and dishwashing liquid).  Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three experimental treatments.  Sales data provided by the 
local grocery store was used to calculate the true field market share of each good in each 
product category.  This study confirmed the implicit assumption made in much 
experimental work: that non-hypothetical lab valuations more closely mirror field 
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behavior than hypothetical valuations.  Results indicated that all elicitation methods 
exhibited a high level of external validity.  Overall, non-hypothetical approaches, 
especially the non-hypothetical ranking method, predicted retail sales more accurately 
than the hypothetical choice experiment.  The RPL model, which relaxes the assumption 
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives of the MNL by modeling preference 
heterogeneity, exhibited the best predictive performance followed by the MNL.  However, 
the IAL model, which relaxes the assumption of deterministic choice sets of the MNL, 
never outperformed the MNL and RPL models.     
The second study incorporated fairness concerns into a field: food consumption.  
Although a number of experimental studies have found other-regarding behavior of 
participants in their simulated settings, few studies have actually discovered such other-
regarding behavior in the field.  This essay determined whether fairness concerns carry 
over to food choice and investigated the extent to which the fairness models proposed in 
the general economics literatures explain food purchasing behavior.  Mail surveys were 
developed and sent to a random sample of consumers.  Responds indicated the likelihood 
of purchasing a loaf of bread which had a particular price and a specified amount of profit 
from the purchase going to the participants in the food supply chain: small farmers, large 
farmers, agribusiness processors, and grocery stores.   
Although none of all fairness concerns considered in this essay were identified as 
statistically significant, or even one (ERC) was significant, the opposite sign was found 
than expected sign, all models suggested that consumers do care about the benefits to 
small farmers.  Moreover, people believed every participant, especially small farmers, in 
the food marketing channel benefit more from selling organic bread than conventional 
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non-organic bread.  These results might explain high portion (from 39.9% to 48.8%) of 
premium for organic bread over conventional bread which represents consumers’ 
concerns for the distribution of profits across participants in the supply chain. In general, 
however, results indicated that the general fairness models proposed in economic 
literatures have little explanatory power in the food purchasing decision.  With concerns 
about unclearness of perception of consumers’ own payouts, original fairness models 
were modified by excluding profits to self (“consumers”).  All modified models revealed 
better out-of-sample predictive performance by two criteria, the MSE and OSLLF.   All 
estimates for fairness concerns were statistically significant and expected sign.  For 
example, the fairness coefficient in the FS model was positive (5.727), implying that 
people dislike the payoff difference between small farmers and any other participants in 
the food supply chain.  As previously watched, a premium for organic bread described by 
concerns for fairness accounted for about 40% of total willingness-to-pay premium. 
The third paper used Monte Carlo simulations to determine the sensitivity of RPL 
estimates.  As a result of conceptual advantages and realistic assumption imposed, the 
RPL model has been increasingly used in various research areas, resulting in the further 
development of econometric software packages which provide user-friendly “canned” 
routines to estimate the RPP models.  In this study, the sensitivity of RPL estimates was 
determined with a variety of factors: the level of preference heterogeneity, sample size, 
number of replications used in the simulated maximum likelihood approach, and 
econometric software package.  
Results from Monte Carlo experiments indicated RPL estimates exhibit bias in 
small sample and this tendency diminished by increasing sample size.  However, in large 
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sample, it was observed high possibility of type I error.  The standard MNL model fits 
better than the RPL with simulated data which has no taste heterogeneity.  While, 
surprisingly, the number of replications in simulated maximum likelihood function did 
not have much influence on the RPL estimates, there was difference between the software 
packages.  In general, LIMDEP-NLOGIT generated most efficient estimates in terms of 
RMSE.  
Results of this dissertation not only enhance our understanding of the preference 
elicitation methods and econometric models frequently employed in studies of consumer 
demand but also provoke several issues for additional researches to improve the current 
study.   In the first essay, three preference elicitation methods were utilized to compare 
the external validity of surveys and experiments.  Although these three methods are 
widely used, there are alternative approaches, such as experimental auction auctions.  
Recently, this method has captured much attention of researchers to determine consumer 
behavior for several advantages such as incentive compatibility and flexibility to use.  In 
addition to preference elicitation methods, several econometric models - for example, 
latent class model, nested logit model, and generalized extreme value model - can be also 
compared to predict actual shopping behavior.  Including more methods and models and, 
if possible, providing additional results for high levels of external validity of those should 
increase confidence for the elicited values.  
As found in the first essay, hypothetical elicitation approaches often produce 
overestimated preference values, a phenomenon referred to as hypothetical bias.  In the 
second study, the hypothetical mail survey method was used, thus there is possibility of 
distortion in the results.  Conducting an experimental method with real monetary 
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payments and comparing this new study to the second essay might be interesting for 
further studies.  While the “fairness” motive was incorporated into consumers’ food 
purchasing behavior in the second essay, this motive can be also applied to other 
applications.  For example, consumers might have preference for the government 
subsidies to farms or the direct payment programs to defend domestic farmers associated 
with international trade, which might be explained by fairness concerns for farmers or 
agricultural sector.   
Results in the third essay show differences in RPL performance across software 
packages in small samples.  Although several possible explanations were addressed, 
further research is needed to examine in detail why large differences in RPL estimates 
exist across software packages.  Moreover, this study can be expanded by considering 
welfare values (e.g., willingness-to-pay) calculated by using estimates.  In estimating the 
RPL model, practitioners should assume the distribution of the random parameters.  It 
means that different distribution assumption for the random parameters may yield 
different parameter estimates, as results, different preference values.  
Future studies addressed the aforementioned concerns are expected to provide 
researchers, agribusiness, and policy makers with more in-depth insights on consumer 
behavior.           
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